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A STUDY OF CN. DOMITIUS CORBULO  
AS FOUND IN THE "ANNALS"  
OF TACITUS

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF ARTS  
AND LITERATURE IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE  
OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

(DEPARTMENT OF LATIN)

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


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BY

DRAPER T. SCHOONOVER

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**MARIETTA, OHIO**



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## INTRODUCTION

All scholars will agree that the account of Corbulo's campaigns given in the *Annals* of Tacitus goes back to the *Memoirs* of Corbulo as its ultimate source. Those who have discussed the subject have assumed that Tacitus had at hand the *Memoirs* and drew upon them for material for the narrative as we have it. The treatment of Corbulo is so unique and so at variance with what one expects to find in the history of Tacitus that it has led some scholars, as Held, Fabia,<sup>1</sup> and Imendörffer<sup>2</sup> to assume that he made use of other works at his command to correct and supplement the *Memoirs*. But the general view has been that the *Memoirs* were the basis for the account which Tacitus gives. It is from this general view that I dissent; I wish to show that so far as the account in the *Annals* goes Tacitus did not

<sup>1</sup> The following quotations will illustrate the views of scholars relating to this subject:

Egli *Feldzüge in Armenien* Büdinger, p. 333: "Die Geschichte der armenisch-parthischen Feldzüge nach Tacitus wird nach ihrer geschichtlichen und geographischen Seite durchaus von dem Gesichtspunkte einer verherrlichenden Lebensbeschreibung des Corbulo beherrscht oder:

"Der Zweck des Tacitus war die Lebensbeschreibung seines Helden Corbulo auf der Folie des weltgeschichtlichen Thema's der Eroberung Armeniens."

Held *De Gn. Domitio Corbulone*, p. 24: "Triplex sane in rerum enarratione argumentorum et testimoniorum genus agnosces: unum, ex quo diversorum scriptorum opera in iudicium vocata ab annalium auctore sentias, alterum, quo epistolarum a Corbulone ad Caesarem missarum et procul dubio actis imperialibus adiectarum usum non recusatum esse comprobetur; tertium, ex quo emergat ex historia rerum a Corbulone confecta tamquam ex fonte Cornelium Tacitum hausisse."

A. v. Gutschmid "Geschichte Irans und seiner Nachbarländer," in Schanz *Rom. Lit.*, sec. 442: "Die beiden Berichte, die wir über diese (armenischen) Ereignisse haben, der des Tacitus und der des Dio gehen auf eine und dieselbe Quelle zurück, die Memoiren des Corbulo."

Imendörffer *Beiträge zur Quellenkunde der sechs letzten Bücher der Annalen des Tacitus*, pp. 5, 6: ". . . darf man dagegen mit einiger Zuversicht vermuthen, dass Tacitus die von dem römischen Feldherrn Domitius Corbulo gelieferte Beschreibung des von ihm selbst geleiteten Feldzuges gegen die Parther allerdings ausgiebig benutzt hat. . . . Es ist also recht wohl möglich, dass Tacitus die Angaben Corbulos durch die einer anderen Quelle hie und da ergänzt und corrigiert hat, worauf aus das 'reliqua non in obscuro habentur' hinzuweisen scheint."

Fabia *Les sources de Tacite dans les Histories et les Annales*, p. 336: Si Tacite n'a pas pris pour source principale les *Mémoires* de Corbulon, c'est d'abord qu'il le soupçonnait de n'avoir pas toujours dit la vérité." Cf. Furneaux *Annals of Tac.*, Vol. II, p. 109.

use the *Memoirs*, but employed and partially incorporated into his history an encomiastic biography of unknown source. Paucity of historical fact and an excess of personal characterization have been observed by commentators and such treatment of a subject is not in keeping with true objective historical narration. While history and biography overlap, yet the ancients recognized pretty clearly the function of each.

## DIFFERENCE BETWEEN BIOGRAPHY AND HISTORY

The difference between biography and history is the basis of an important difference between the literary technique of biography and of history which is not always observed consistently, but is to be looked upon as definitely recognized. So, for example, in the early books of the *Annals* Tacitus gives a careful account of the campaigns of Germanicus. The temptation to treat Germanicus biographically must have been very great, yet he confines himself strictly to the technique of history, which required the suppression of individual figures and the paying of due consideration to chronology and topography. Whatever Tacitus affords for the characterization of Germanicus he affords indirectly<sup>1</sup> by allowing his merits to come out from the facts of history treated as such. The ancient rhetoricians afford a clearly defined theory of history,<sup>2</sup> but not of biography. So far as a theory of biography is afforded, it is to be found in the theory of encomium. For though biography became different from formal encomium, yet the aim of both was essentially the same: the presentation of character and merit (ἥθος and ἀρετή).<sup>3</sup> Biography was concerned with facts of history only in so far as they served to illustrate these. It neglected chronology and topography which were the concern of the historian. For its object was not to narrate the facts of history *per se*, but only to use the deeds of its subject as indicative of his virtue. This is true of the *Agricola*, for "although the external form of historiography is preserved, yet in its essence the account is in the manner of encomium, in which the πράξεις are adduced, not as historical events *per se*, but as indications of traits of character."<sup>4</sup> From this point of view all ancient biography was written from the *Euagoras* of Isocrates on, and almost without exception the

<sup>1</sup> Bruns *Die Persönlichkeit in der Geschichtsschreibung der Alten*, p. 71: "Bei den beiden ersten (Augustus, Germanicus) hat sich Tacitus auf das erste Hauptmittel des indirekten Stils beschränkt, das Urtheil durch Andere."

<sup>2</sup> *Rhet. Lat. Min.*, ed. Halm, p. 588: "Historici officii sunt tria: ut veras res, ut dilucide, ut breviter exponat."

<sup>3</sup> Leo *Die griechisch-römische Biographie*, p. 147: "ἱστορία erzählt die πράξεις von Völkern und Männern, βίος schildert das ἥθος eines Mannes. Diesem Zwecke dient im βίος die Erzählung der πράξεις, nur soviel wird von den der Geschichte angehörnden πράξεις ausgewählt und nur soweit wird von den ausgewählten berichtet, als es für die Schilderung des ἥθος dienlich ist."

<sup>4</sup> Hendrickson *The Proconsulate of Julius Agricola*, p. 20.

writers of ancient biography have given utterance to their realization of the difference between biography and history.<sup>5</sup>

But neither Germanicus nor Agricola affords the best comparison with Corbulo, because Germanicus was a prince and naturally held a conspicuous place in the eyes of the Roman world. The *Agricola* was written out of filial devotion and received an encomiastic treatment. The best examples for comparison will be afforded by men of like position with Corbulo and in these we have Suetonius Paulinus and Ostorius Scapula, of whom a more detailed account will be given as showing Tacitus' method of treating leading generals in his histories.

#### OSTORIUS SCAPULA

Ostorius Scapula was appointed *propraetor* to Britain where, on his arrival, he found the natives in a state of insurrection. They thought no active movements would be taken against them because the general was unacquainted with the army and winter was approaching. But in this they were deceived, for Ostorius knew the effect that an immediate offensive movement would have in striking dismay into the enemy and in increasing the confidence of his own troops. He caught the enemy unawares and routed it. Tacitus then gives an account of the revolt of the Iceni and a description of their stronghold. This place, though difficult of access, was captured by Ostorius without any legionary force and among the deeds of valor displayed was the saving the life of a citizen by the lieutenant's son. After this battle the tribes were quiet, at least nominally so, and the army was led among the Ceangi. Devastation of the fields went on where there was any unrest on the part of the natives. Ostorius was ready to cross over into Ireland when news came of the revolt of the Brigantes. This tribe was soon subdued, but the Silures, who were now in revolt under the leadership of Caratacus were not put down so quickly.

<sup>5</sup> Plut. *Alexander* 1: οὔτε γὰρ ἱστορίας γράφομεν, ἀλλὰ βίους, οὔτε ταῖς ἐπιφανεστάταις πράξεσι πάντως ἐνεστί δῆλωσις ἀρετῆς ἢ κακίας, ἀλλὰ πρᾶγμα βραχὺ πολλάκις καὶ ῥῆμα καὶ παιδιὰ τις ἔμφασιν ἤθους ἐποίησε μᾶλλον ἢ μάχαι μυρίονεκροι καὶ παραδείξεις αἱ μέγισται καὶ πολιορκίαι πόλεων. Nepos *Pelopidas* 1: "cuius de virtutibus dubito quem ad modum exponam, quod vereor, si res explicare incipiam ne non vitam eius enarrare, sed historiam videar scribere. *Epaminondas* 1: "cum autem exprimere imaginem consuetudinis atque vitae velimus Epaminondae, nihil videmur debere praetermittere, quod pertineat ad eam declarandam," and at the close of this same life Nepos adds: "huius de virtutibus vitaeque satis erit dictum." Polybius x. 21 (24), 5 ff.: ὥσπερ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ὁ τύπος, ὑπάρχων ἐγκωμαστικός, ἀπῆτει τὸν κεφαλαιώδη καὶ μετ' αὐξήσεως τῶν πράξεων ἀπολογισμὸν· οὕτως ὁ τῆς ἱστορίας, κοινός ὢν ἐπαίνου καὶ ψόγου, ζητεῖ τὸν ἀληθῆ καὶ τὸν μετ' ἀποδείξεως καὶ τῶν ἐκάστοις παρεπομένων συλλογισμὸν.



At this point Caratacus becomes the leading figure in the narrative. The historian, after giving a careful description of the barbarian stronghold, adds an epitomized speech of Caratacus to his followers just before the battle. The enthusiasm displayed by the barbarians amazed Ostorius, but the Roman officers and troops were confident and urged him to lead them against the enemy. After a description of the fight, Tacitus turns to an extended account of the long struggle of Caratacus against the Roman power, his capture, his reputation throughout the islands, Gaul, and even Italy, so that the emperor to satisfy the curiosity of the Roman populace had Caratacus, his wife, daughters, and brothers exhibited in public. He characterizes him as he stood before the imperial tribunal and gives an epitome of the speech he delivered.

Turning to the senate Tacitus says it spoke eloquently on the capture of Caratacus, likening it to the capture of Syphax by Scipio and of Perses by Paulus. It voted the insignia of a triumph to Ostorius. But soon the followers of the barbarian chieftain in Britain revolted and the writer gives an account of the loss of some Roman troops and of the guerrilla warfare that was carried on. In the midst of these troubles Ostorius died and where the historian might have been tempted to add a direct characterization of the general he has not done so, but has adhered to the technique of history. The writer was concerned primarily with facts of history, and so far as a characterization of Ostorius is afforded, it is afforded indirectly and without any sacrifice of the narrative of events. There is no mention of the personal appearance of Ostorius, of his power of discipline, of the special inclination of the soldiers and natives toward him, of his sharing the hardships of his soldiers, of his shrewdness in detecting the schemes of the enemy and of pitting one tribe against another, of his moderation in success, and there is no contrast with another general. Greater prominence is given the situation in Britain as Ostorius found it, the revolt of the Iceni and Brigantes, the campaigns against the Siluræ and Ordovices, the position of the conquered Caratacus, and the guerrilla warfare carried on until the death of Ostorius.

#### SUETONIUS PAULINUS

The field of action of Suetonius Paulinus also was Britain. On arriving there he at once made preparations to invade the island of Mona. After a brief statement of the preparations made, Tacitus gives a description of the motley host of Druids, women with fire-brands running to and fro and soldiers assembled on the shore to meet the Romans who crossed against them, some by wading and swimming and some by means of boats. The

Romans were victorious. In the midst of their success news came of the rising of the Iceni under Boudicca, and the causes leading to the revolt are narrated in a way that implies criticism of the conduct of the Romans toward the natives and their lack of preparations against a possible rebellion. An account is given of the omens observed which the Britons regarded as foreboding the defeat of the Romans. The outbreak came in the absence of Paulinus and the Romans were annihilated. A force under Cerialis coming to their assistance lost all its infantry, while Cerialis and the cavalry escaped. Suetonius marched straight through the enemy to Londinium and after viewing the situation resolved to sacrifice one town in order to save all. Against the prayers of the people he marched away, but granted all who wished to follow, a place in the line of march. Of those who remained behind, the Britons slew eighty thousand and ravaged at will in vengeance for the wrongs that had been inflicted upon them.

When Suetonius was ready to meet the enemy he chose a place for battle in a defile with narrow opening facing the enemy and hedged in by a forest behind, so that he feared no ambush. Then Tacitus gives a description of the gathered mass of Britons and of the activity of Boudicca in urging on her followers. He shows how Suetonius by a speech aroused the ardor of his soldiers to such a pitch that he was sure of the outcome and gave the command to attack. A description of the attack and defeat of the Britons follows. Eighty thousand Britons were said to have perished and only four hundred Romans. Boudicca took poison and Poeninus Postumus who had disobeyed the orders of his superior and cheated his legion out of a share in the honor of victory, committed suicide when news of the success reached him. Then the troops, brought together and augmented by additional forces from Germany, went into winter quarters. Many of the rebellious tribes were brought to terms by fire and sword, but the more spirited slowly yielded by reason of the lack of harmony between Suetonius and Julius Classicianus the procurator who had succeeded Catus.

In this account also we find that Tacitus has adhered strictly to the technique of history. An excellent opportunity to characterize Suetonius was afforded by his march through the enemy to Londinium, but no description of the march is given. In the accounts of both generals whatever encomiastic touches occur are merely incidental and the elements of encomiastic treatment do not occur in anything like the amplification in which we shall find them in the account of Corbulo. The narration of facts is faithfully kept. The leaders are conspicuous figures, but not more so than we should expect.

## CHRONOLOGY

In dealing with the question of the chronology of Corbulo's life and campaigns my aim will be to show that Tacitus (and his source) followed merely the sequence of events, and that he either had no clear idea of the chronology or, if he had, did not care to make use of it. In the account of the campaign against the Chauci,<sup>1</sup> Nipperdey regards the events as spread over more than one year, although they are given as having taken place in the year 47, and there is nothing in the narrative itself to show that they extended over a longer period.

The question of chronology which has caused so much discussion, begins with the appointment of Corbulo to take charge of affairs in Armenia. Nero came to the throne in October of 54, and one of his first acts was to appoint Corbulo to command in the East. While not expressly so stated, the natural inference is that he went to the East in the spring of 55, but the events narrated in xiii. 8, 9, must have extended over more than one year.<sup>2</sup> When we come to the account in xiii. 34-41, we again find events given under the year 58, which must have extended over more than one year. The chronology of the chapters and the assignment of events depends somewhat on the way in which we interpret the "miraculum" in chap. 41. Egli takes it to refer to the eclipse of April 30, 59, mentioned by Pliny, *N. H.* ii. 180, and thus assigns a definite date for the destruction of Artaxata. Laufenburg, Furneaux, and Henderson reject Egli's argument on the ground that such a description could not refer to an eclipse and that Corbulo could not have reached Artaxata so soon in the spring. Henderson explains it as some effect of cloud and sunshine. They all admit that Tacitus knew of the above eclipse and refers to it in xiv. 12, where he says: *iam sol repente obscuratus et tactae de coelo quattuordecim urbis regiones.*

Now there were just two eclipses which Corbulo in Armenia might have seen. A total eclipse April 30, 59, and a partial eclipse October 13, 60.<sup>3</sup> Of these the latter is not to be taken into consideration because it was not one of any magnitude and for the further reason that Pliny very definitely gives the year in which Corbulo observed the eclipse reported: *Solis defectum Vipstano et Fonteio coss.* These men were consuls for the year 59. As Corbulo reported an eclipse for this year and the one of April

<sup>1</sup> xi. 18, 19.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. "quae in alios consules egressa coniunxi."

<sup>3</sup> See Ginzel *Spezieller Canon der Finsternisse*, p. 77.

30 was the only one he could have seen in Armenia in that year the question resolves itself into this: Could the description in Tacitus refer to an eclipse and could Corbulo have been in Artaxata at the time of its occurrence? In the description as we have it commentators have made the mistake of assuming that Tacitus took it from Corbulo's *Memoirs*. Henderson says that it is best to dissociate the account in Pliny from that in Tacitus, but gives no adequate reason for doing so. The two accounts in a certain sense are to be dissociated, namely in this: in the account of Pliny we have the record of an eclipse given by a historian and as he found it in Corbulo's *Memoirs*, and in the passage of Tacitus we have a rhetorical amplification of the same phenomena used by an encomiast to exalt the praises of the general by enlisting, so to speak, the co-operation of nature itself. The purpose of the one is to set forth truthfully facts of history, that of the other is to glorify the man he is describing, and he makes all facts serve this purpose.

No doubt the phenomena observed by Corbulo were very unusual. That phenomena observed at times of eclipses are very remarkable, is a well-known fact. The following is a description from Monroe B. Synder:

As totality approaches, a pale-purple coloring spreads over the landscape. Within a minute of the total phase, the phenomena begin to succeed each other so rapidly that no single observer can note them all. By those glancing at the landscape in the direction of the approaching shadow a majestic darkness will be seen to sweep forward with a swiftness truly impressive. Those looking at the earth, and away from the eclipsing sun, will see a *succession of flitting bands, alternately dark and bright, known as the shadow bands*, which for many decades remained an unexplained puzzle.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> *Cyclopedia Americana* under "Eclipse." For further evidence of the strangeness of the phenomena we may compare the following: "The most instantaneous darkening of the orb of day, more particularly when it is unlooked for, is calculated to impress a spectator with vague terror; even when expected, it fills the mind with awe, as a demonstration of the forces and motions of the mechanism of the universe. The sudden darkness, too, is impressive from its strangeness as much as occurring by day; it resembles neither the darkness of night nor the gloom of twilight. . . . Stars and planets appear, and all animals are dismayed by the general aspect of nature."—*The International Cyclopedia*, Vol. V, p. 257. "When the sun was reduced to a small crescent, the shadows of all objects were depicted with great severity and blackness reminding one of the effects of illumination with the electric light. The sky at this period assumed an indigo tint, and the landscape was tinged with a bronze hue."—Warren De La Rue *Athenaeum*, Vol. II, p. 269. "On looking up one of the grandest spectacles of which it is possible to conceive met the eye. Surrounding the dark body of the moon was a crown of light, with rays shooting out in five great sheaths to a distance equal to the sun's diameter, or nearly a million of miles. No painting can represent it and no pen can describe it."—Quoted by Newcomb of an eclipse observed in the United States, August 7, 1869, *Universal Encyclopedia*, under "Eclipse."

While the quotations given refer to total eclipses, yet the phenomena might very well be true in great measure of a partial eclipse of the magnitude of the one in question, which for Artaxata was 9°.5 I think the two accounts in Tacitus and Pliny refer to the same eclipse, and that Artaxata was destroyed April 30, 59.

As to the argument that Corbulo could not have reached Artaxata so soon, it is not proven because we do not know where Corbulo spent the winter. There is absolutely no hint of winter quarters nor that Corbulo still drew his supplies from Trapezus. It seems far more reasonable to assume that he did winter within striking distance of Artaxata. Moreover, after his successful campaign of 58 there would be no enemy between his camp and Trapezus, if he still wished to draw supplies from that place and we know that he won over the Moschi to an alliance. It is more plausible to suppose that the three forts were taken in 58, whence arose the confidence of taking Artaxata, but the season was too far spent to permit of preparations and a march against that city. Then with no enemy behind him Corbulo would go into winter quarters preparatory for an early march in the spring on Artaxata. Tiridates would most naturally withdraw to Artaxata after the failure of the negotiations and winter there. This assumption is strengthened by the fact that we hear nothing of him until Corbulo is close to the city. Under ordinary circumstances an army would not leave its winter quarters until there was a reasonable assurance of fair weather, but the hardships of an early march would not be greater than those endured in the winter quarters of 57-58. The very thing that Corbulo would do would be to strike early and rapidly in order to take the enemy by surprise and catch him unprepared. That the Romans met with no serious opposition is a just inference from the fact that none is recorded until the day before the surrender of Artaxata. In view of this a march of 150 or 200 miles would be entirely possible in early spring.

It seems best to take the winter referred to in xiii. 35 as that of 57-58, or the one previous to the opening of an active campaign. The events narrated up to and including the taking of the three forts, I believe, all happened in the year 58. Most editors regard Volandum as identical with Ὀλανή<sup>6</sup> of Strabo, from the resemblance the words bear to each other. To my mind the evidence is not conclusive, and the identity of the two places is highly improbable from the situation as we have it. Those who believe in the identity of the two names also believe that the capture of Artaxata followed immediately the capture of the three forts in one and the same year. They are led to this belief from the fact that all chronological

<sup>5</sup> Ginzell, p. 202.

<sup>6</sup> Strabo xi. 14. 6.

data are lacking. But this is a place where the writer has disregarded the time element. It seems more likely that Volandum was some stronghold in northwest Armenia where Corbulo was when the negotiations between him and Tiridates were broken off in 58. Corbulo had hoped to adjudicate matters by negotiation, and avoid the necessity of overrunning Armenia—a method which he followed consistently throughout his entire command. The most natural inference is that no extensive plans had been laid for overrunning Armenia, and going to Artaxata until after the first negotiations had failed. This belief is strengthened by the fact that he did not understand the Parthians at first, as is shown by his seeking long and in vain to get a battle with them on Roman lines of fighting.<sup>7</sup> The negotiations having failed, he at once began active operations, captured the three forts, and then conceived the idea of aiming a blow directly at the capital, as is shown by these words: *unde orta fiducia caput gentis Artaxata adgre-diendi*.<sup>8</sup> Now if Volandum was the same as Ὀλανή and if Corbulo had captured it with so little effort, and had come so near Artaxata, there would have been no need to say that the capture of Volandum “inspired a resolution to attempt Artaxata,” for he never would have reached Volandum without having resolved to attack Artaxata. The words above do have their proper significance if they are applied to the capture of the fort in the year previous to the capture of the Armenian capital, and if that fort was at a considerable distance from Artaxata.

The situation up to this point resolves itself into this. Armenia was to be the field of action. Corbulo in Cappadocia made his levy of troops from that and the adjoining states, but could not take the field for some years owing to the demoralized condition of the army. Fortunately for the Romans the Parthians were distracted by a revolt. When Corbulo felt strong enough to take the field he led his troops into winter quarters somewhere in northwest Armenia. That he was in this region is shown by the fact that Tiridates broke off the negotiations in order to intercept provisions coming to the Romans by way of Trapezus. In these winter quarters the discipline of the troops would be completed for the coming campaigns and a Roman army on Armenian soil would serve to bring the Parthians to some sort of understanding. The following season would be given up to the negotiations and the first year's campaign, concluding with the capture of the three forts. Corbulo would then go into winter quarters near where he had been carrying on his campaign and where supplies could still reach him from Trapezus if he wished to draw from that place, as the enemy would have been forced back toward Artaxata and the country

<sup>7</sup> xiii. 37.

<sup>8</sup> xiii. 39.

would be free from an enemy behind him. His safety, moreover, would be further insured by an alliance with the Moschi.<sup>9</sup> In these winter quarters he would make ready for a rapid march on Artaxata in the spring when he must have cut loose from his base of supplies. He would make an early and rapid march in order to take the enemy by surprise and confuse him by the very rapidity of his movements.

It will be observed that no mention is made of the winter 58-59. Events are run together without reference to when they occurred, showing that the writer had in mind some other purpose than annalistic narration; it made no difference to him whether the forts were taken in 58 or 59.

I think we can assume that Artaxata was immediately destroyed after its surrender and that Corbulo at once set out for Tigranocerta. Furneaux is of a different opinion, but this is the view of Egli and Henderson, and such is the plain statement of the text. It would be the very course to be expected—rapid, decisive movements on the part of the Romans. Nothing else would have such disheartening effect on the Parthians and Armenians who were opposed to them.

In the summer of 59, probably about the middle of August,<sup>10</sup> Corbulo was in Tauronitium. For just before reaching this place the army had come into cultivated fields and had reaped the crops. Not long after this ambassadors came from Tigranocerta offering the surrender of the city. All commentators save Furneaux are agreed that Corbulo reached Tigranocerta in the fall of 59. Now whether the capture of Legerda and the return of the Hyrcanian ambassadors took place in the year 59 or 60 is uncertain from the account in Tacitus. But the events narrated in xiv. 23, 24 must have followed immediately after the destruction of Artaxata and it seems best to assume at least the capture of Legerda in the year 59, assuming that this place was some fort not far from Tigranocerta. The return of the Hyrcanian embassy could hardly have occurred in the year 59 for the reason that Corbulo reached Tigranocerta late in the year, and it would not be likely that news could have reached the ambassadors in time to permit of their arrival in the fall or winter. Then, too, the territory which they would have had to cross from the borders of Syria would have

<sup>9</sup> xiii. 37.

<sup>10</sup> Egli *Feldzüge in Armenien* Büdinger p. 288. In den Sommer 59 fällt der Marsch des Corbulo von Artaxata nach Tigranocerta mit dem Angriff der Marder. . . . Schon vorher war in Hocharmenien das Getreide geerntet worden, was frühestens im August geschehen sein konnte; denn in der milden Tauranitis sah Brandt (Bei Ritter. *Erdkunde* X, 671) am 7. August trotz starker Sommerhitze das Getreide noch ungereift. Corbulo hatte aber schon vor Ankunft in der Tauranitis, also in einer höher liegenden, nicht so milden Gegend geerntet.



been more or less hostile. But the account as we have it gives everything as happening in one year, the march from Artaxata, the return of the embassy, the thwarting of Tiridates' attempts, the coming of Tigranes and the return of Corbulo to Syria. Manifestly we have here events narrated which refer to two years, but no mention is made of the winter 59-60. Commentators seem agreed that Corbulo spent one winter in Tigranocerta, and that it must have been this winter, but Tacitus makes no mention of such a thing. It is simply an inference from the fact that too many things are narrated to have occurred in one year. Possibly the capture of Legerda ended the campaign of 59. Then Corbulo wintered in Tigranocerta and during the winter, or far more likely the following spring, the Hyrcanian embassy returned, while the year 60 was given up to a campaign against Tiridates, the setting-up of Tigranes, and the withdrawal of Corbulo to Syria. As before, we see here a disregard for the annalistic arrangement. There is a sequence of events, but so closely interwoven that no one can tell which of them belong to the year 59, and which to the year 60.

This running of events together is seen in xv. 1-17. Under the year 62 events are narrated which must belong to three different years for three separate winters are referred to: *hibernavisse*;<sup>11</sup> *hieme*;<sup>12</sup> and *hibernavit*.<sup>13</sup> Furneaux, following Nipperdey, takes *hibernavisse* as referring to the winter of 61-62, but it must refer to that of 60-61, as will be seen from what follows. *Hibernavit* refers to 62-63, the winter after the defeat of Paetus.<sup>14</sup> This leaves two winters unaccounted for. *Instante iam hieme* must be the winter previous to the defeat of Paetus, or 61-62. Then *hibernavisse* refers to the winter 60-61. That *hibernavisse* refers to this winter is shown by the implied criticism of Corbulo in his withdrawal from Tigranocerta to hastily constructed winter quarters on the borders of Syria. So we have the following: For the year 59, the taking of Artaxata, march to Tigranocerta and its surrender, the capture of Legerda and winter quarters at Tigranocerta; 60, the coming of the Hyrcanian embassy, overrunning of Armenia, establishment of Tigranes on the throne, and the withdrawal of Corbulo to Syria; 61, Corbulo in Syria fortifies the Euphrates, compels Vologeses to come to terms; Paetus arrives; he crosses the Taurus on an expedition against Tigranocerta late in the season, it seems, and without any apparent success; 62, Corbulo guards Cappadocia; Paetus is defeated; winter in Cappadocia. The events narrated in xv. 25-31 are given as having taken place in the following year, 63.

From this we see that no attention is paid to the narrating of events in

<sup>11</sup> xv. 6.

<sup>12</sup> xv. 8.

<sup>13</sup> xv. 17.

<sup>14</sup> "Exim Paetus per Cappadociam hibernavit;" see xv. 23 which begins the year 63.

regular annalistic order. They are run together in such a way that it is impossible to assign definitely to the exact year the events as they occurred. That such is the case one has only to read the accounts of the commentators already mentioned. The writer had another purpose in mind, and was not concerned with an impartial recording of facts of history. He seized such facts in the life and campaigns of Corbulo as served his purpose and wherever chronological data are afforded they are afforded only incidentally.

## TOPOGRAPHY

When we come to consider the topography of Corbulo's campaigns we find even greater disregard for places than we found for time in the matter of chronology. The mention of places is merely incidental and it is not likely that a definite geography will ever be made out. The question has been carefully studied by Egli and Henderson.<sup>1</sup> The latter makes a careful comparison of the ancient authorities in regard to the positions of Tigranocerta and of Rhandaia. He further compares the views of the modern writers who have discussed the subject and concludes by agreeing with none of them in all points.

The first place mentioned is Aegea, a town in Cilicia on the gulf of Issus, where Corbulo met Quadratus. Where he was until active campaigning began we are not told except that he moved troops across Syria and made levies in Galatia and Cappadocia.<sup>2</sup> We infer that the winter quarters of 57-58 were in northwest Armenia from the fact that Tiridates withdraws to intercept provisions coming to the Romans by way of Trapezus. Also, *inlecti Moschi*,<sup>3</sup> would indicate that Corbulo was engaged in northern Armenia. The next place mentioned is Volandum,<sup>4</sup> but the account in Tacitus gives us no clear idea as to where it was, whether near to or far from Artaxata nor in what direction it lay. Three forts were taken in one day, but this is the only one named. Corbulo was next in Artaxata on the Araxes River. Hence it is apparent how meager is the geographical knowledge up to this point: Aegea, Trapezus, Volandum, Artaxata.

The next objective point of Corbulo was Tigranocerta and while it seems to be impossible to locate the site today yet we may rightly assume that the situation caused the people of ancient times no such trouble. But of the march between Artaxata and Tigranocerta only the Mardi, a people, and Tauraunitium, a district, are mentioned. These are general statements, while all geographical details are disregarded, which leads to the conclusion that the writer had no general idea of the geography or else he had in mind some other purpose than historical narration. As regards fort Legerda<sup>5</sup> we have to infer that it was somewhere near Tigranocerta, but it cannot be located. Nisibis<sup>6</sup> was said to be 37 miles from Tigranocerta, but if we look into modern discussions of the subject we are led to the conclusion that here again the writer did not have the situation clearly

<sup>1</sup> *The English Journal of Philology*, Vol. XXVIII, pp. 99, 271.

<sup>2</sup> xiii. 35.

<sup>3</sup> xiii. 37.

<sup>4</sup> xiii. 39.

<sup>5</sup> xiv. 25.

<sup>6</sup> xv. 5.

in mind, for there is no place which will satisfy the statements given by ancient writers as to the relative positions of the two cities.

The next topographical indications are general statements and might apply to any one of many places. An escort was given the Hyrcanian embassy to the Red Sea: *ne Euphraten transgressi hostium custodiis circumvenirentur*.<sup>7</sup> Corbulo went to drive out Tiridates who had entered: *per Medos extrema Armeniae*.<sup>8</sup> Then Corbulo withdrew into Syria: *atque interim reliquos legiones pro ripa Euphratis locat*.<sup>9</sup>

Now if we turn to Paetus we find that he was north of Mt. Taurus: *rapit exercitum trans montem Taurum recipiendis, ut ferebat, Tigranocertis*.<sup>10</sup> Shortly before his defeat he placed a force on Mt. Taurus: *tria millia delecti peditis proximo iugo imposuit*,<sup>11</sup> and his wife in a stronghold called Arsamosata: *cui Arsamosata nomen est*.<sup>12</sup> He bridged the river Arsanias at a place where the stream was fordable.<sup>13</sup> Cassius Dio<sup>14</sup> says that Paetus was besieged at a place called Rhandeia, on the Arsanias, but observe that the account in Tacitus is not so definite. All that is given is that Paetus was somewhere north of Mt. Taurus on the Arsanias. When Paetus sent to Corbulo for assistance the latter hastened to him through Commagene and Cappadocia: *regionem Commagenam, exim Cappadociam, inde Armenios petivit*.<sup>15</sup> He met Paetus on the banks of the Euphrates: *Corbulo cum suis copiis apud ripam Euphratis obvius. . . . praetulit*,<sup>16</sup> and then withdrew to Syria: *Syriam repetiturum*; and Paetus to Cappadocia: *exim Paetus per Cappadociam hibernavit*.<sup>17</sup>

Now where the ambassadors<sup>18</sup> from Vologeses and Tiridates met Corbulo we do not know, but Corbulo crossed the Euphrates at Melitene: *apud Melitenen, qua transire Euphraten parabat*.<sup>19</sup> And although they met to adjudicate matters on the field of Paetus' disgrace, still we are not given the name of the place. This is remarkable when we consider the way in which the Romans viewed a defeat of that kind and the importance given the place by the meeting of the Roman and Parthian forces there.

To sum up the definite geography in the account in Tacitus we have Aegea, the place of landing when Corbulo went to the East, Artaxata on the Araxes, Tigranocerta in the south of Armenia with Nisibis 37 (?) miles distant, and Melitene on the Euphrates. Less definite is the situation of Paetus north of Mt. Taurus on the Arsanias River and Corbulo in Syria fortifying the Euphrates. Wholly general is the position of Corbulo in Cappadocia and Armenia until he reaches Artaxata, the reference to places

7 xiv. 25.	10 xv. 8.	13 xv. 15.	16 xv. 16.	18 xv. 27.
8 xiv. 26.	11 xv. 10.	14 lxii. 21. 1.	17 xv. 17.	19 xv. 26.
9 xv. 3.	12 xv. 10.	15 xv. 12.		

on the march to Tigranocerta, the invasion and repulse of Tigranes when he enters, *per Medos extrema Armeniae*, the withdrawal of Corbulo to the Euphrates in Syria and his march through Commagene and Cappadocia to aid Paetus.

Those who work out a detailed geography for Corbulo's campaigns do so not from the account in Tacitus, but from that account plus Strabo, Cassius Dio, and Plutarch, and that is the correct way when we wish to get at the facts of topography. But if we consider the account only in Tacitus, we find that very little definite knowledge can be obtained, and it is quite likely that the matter was as confusing to the readers of Tacitus in his day as it is to us. The explanation is that the writer whom Tacitus was following was not concerned with the geography. He selected only the places and made such use of them as would serve to add praise to his hero.

## EXPOSITION

The portions of the *Annals* dealing with Corbulo are here brought together and printed that it may be seen how closely connected the account is and its similarity to a biography. The text is that of Halm.

XI. 18. Per idem tempus Chauci, nulla dissensione domi, et morte Sanquini alacres, dum Corbulo adventat, inferiorem Germaniam incursavere duce Gannasco, qui natione Canninefas, auxiliare stipendium meritis, post transfuga, levibus navigiis praedabundus Gallorum maxime oram vastabat, non ignarus dites et inbelles esse. at Corbulo provinciam ingressus magna cum cura et mox gloria, cui principium illa militia fuit, triremes alveo Rheni, ceteras navium, ut quaeque habiles, per aestuaria et fossas adegit; luntribusque hostium depressis et exturbato Gannasco, ubi praesentia satis composita sunt, legiones operum et laboris ignavas, populationibus laetantes, veterem ad morem reduxit, ne quis agmine decederet nec pugnam nisi iussus iniret. stationes, vigiliae, diurna nocturnaque munia in armis agitabantur. feruntque militem, quia vallum non accinctus, atque alium, quia pugione tantum accinctus foderet, morte punitos. quae nimia et incertum an falso iacta originem tamen e severitate ducis traxere; intantumque et magnis delictis inexorabilem scias, cui tantum asperitatis etiam adversus levia credebatur.

19. Ceterum is terror milites hostesque in diversum adfecit: nos virtutem auximus, barbari ferociam infregere. et natio Frisiorum, post rebellionem clade L. Apronii coeptam infensa aut male fida, datis obsidibus consedit apud agros a Corbulone descriptos: idem senatum, magistratus, leges inposuit. ac ne iussa exuerent, praesidium immunivit, missis qui maiores Chaucos ad deditionem pellicerent, simul Gannascum dolo adgrederentur. nec inritae aut degeneres insidiae fuere adversus transfugam et violatorem fidei. sed caede eius motae Chaucorum mentes, et Corbulo semina rebellionis praebebat, ut laeta apud plerosque, ita apud quosdam sinistra fama. cur hostem conciret? adversa in rem publicam casura: sin prospere egisset, formidolosum paci virum insigne et ignavo principi praegravem. igitur Claudius adeo novam in Germanias vim prohibuit, ut referri praesidia cis Rhenum iuberet.

20. Iam castra in hostili solo molienti Corbuloni eae litterae redduntur. ille re subita, quamquam multa simul offunderentur, metus ex imperatore, contemptio ex barbaris, ludibrium apud socios, nihil aliud prolocutus quam 'beatos quondam duces Romanos', signum receptui dedit. ut tamen miles otium exueret, inter Mosam Rhenumque trium et viginti milium spatio fossam perduxit, qua incerta Oceani vitarentur. insigne tamen triumphi indulsit Caesar, quamvis bellum negavisset.

XIII. 8. . . . laeti, quod Domitium Corbulonem retinendae Armeniae praeposuerat videbaturque locus virtutibus patefactus. copiae Orientis ita dividuntur,

ut pars auxiliarium cum duabus legionibus apud provinciam Suriam et legatum eius Quadratum Ummidium remaneret, par civium sociorumque numerus Corbuloni esset, additis cohortibus alisque, quae in Cappadocia hiemabant. socii reges, prout bello conducirer, parere iussi: sed studia eorum in Corbulonem promptiora erant. qui ut *instaret* famae, quae in novis coeptis validissima est, itinere propere confecto apud Aegeas civitatem Ciliciae obvium Quadratum habuit, illuc progressum, ne, si ad accipiendas copias Suriam intravisset Corbulo, omnium ora in se verteret, corpore ingens, verbis magnificis et super experientiam sapientiamque etiam specie inanium validus.

9. Ceterum uterque ad Vologesem regem nuntiis monebant, pacem quam bellum mallet datisque obsidibus solitam prioribus reverentiam in populum Romanum continuaret. et Vologeses, quo bellum ex commodo pararet, an ut aemulationis suspectos per nomen obsidum amoveret, tradit nobilissimos ex familia Arsacidarum. accepitque eos centurio Insteius ab Ummidio missus, forte prior ea de causa adito rege. quod postquam Corbuloni cognitum est, ire praefectum cohortis Arrium Varum et recipere obsides iubet. hinc ortum inter praefectum et centurionem iurgium ne diutius externis spectaculo esset, arbitrium rei obsidibus legatisque, qui eos ducebant, permissum. atque illi *per* recentem gloriam et inclinatione quadam etiam hostium Corbulonem praetelere. unde discordia inter duces, querente Ummidio praerepta quae suis consiliis patravisset, testante contra Corbulone non prius conversum regem ad offerendos obsides, quam ipse dux bello delectus spes eius ad metum mutaret. Nero quo componeret diversos, si<sup>o</sup> evulgari iussit: ob res a Quadrato et Corbulone prospere gestas laurum fascibus imperatoriis addi. quae in alios consules egressa coniunxi.

34. . . . Eius anni principio mollibus adhuc initiis prolatum inter Parthos Romanosque de obtinenda Armenia bellum acriter resumitur, quia nec Vologeses sinebat fratrem Tiridaten dati a se regni expertem esse aut alienae id potentiae donum habere, et Corbulo dignum magnitudine populi Romani rebatur parta olim a Lucullo Pompeioque recipere. ad hoc Armenii ambigua fide utraque arma invitabant, situ terrarum, similitudine morum Parthis propiores conubiisque permixti ac libertate ignota illuc magis *ut* ad servitium inclinantes.

35. Sed Corbuloni plus molis adversus ignaviam militum quam contra perfidiam hostium erat: quippe Suria transmotae legiones, pace longa segnes, munia castrorum aegerrime tolerabant. satis constitit fuisse in eo exercitu veteranos, qui non stationem, non vigiliis inissent, vallum fossamque quasi nova et mira viserent, sine galeis, sine loriceis, nitidi et quaestuosi, militia per oppida expleta. igitur dimissis, quibus senectus aut valetudo adversa erat, supplementum petivit. et habiti per Galatiam Cappadociamque dilectus, adiectaque ex Germania legio cum equitibus alariis et peditatu cohortium. retentusque omnis exercitus sub pellibus, quamvis hieme saeva adeo, ut obducta glacie nisi effossa humus tentorii locum non praeberet. ambusti multorum artus vi frigoris et quidam inter excubias exanimati sunt. adnotatusque miles, qui fascem lignorum gestabat, ita praeriguisse manus, ut oneri adhaerentes truncis brachiis deciderent. ipse cultu levi, capite intacto, in agmine, in laboribus frequens adesce, laudem



strenuis, solacium invalidis, exemplum omnibus ostendere. dehinc quia duritiam caeli militiaeque multi abnuebant deserebantque, remedium severitate quaesitum est. nec enim, ut in aliis exercitibus, primum alterumque delictum venia prosequeretur, sed qui signa reliquerat, statim capite poenas luebat. idque usu salubre et misericordia melius apparuit: quippe pauciores illa castra deseruere quam ea, in quibus ignoscebatur.

36. Interim Corbulo legionibus intra castra habitis, donec ver adolesceret, dispositisque per idoneos locos cohortibus auxiliariis, ne pugnam priores auderent praedicit: curam praesidiorum Paccio Orfito primi pili honore perfuncto mandat. is quamquam incautos barbaros et bene gerendae rei casum offerri scripserat, tenere se munimentis et maiores copias opperiri iubetur. sed rupto imperio, postquam paucae e proximis castellis turmae advenerant pugnamque imperitia poscebant, congressus cum hoste funditur. et damno eius exterriti qui subsidium ferre debuerant, sua quisque in castra trepida fuga rediere. quod graviter Corbulo accepit increpitumque Paccium et praefectos militesque tendere extra vallum iussit; inque ea contumelia detenti nec nisi precibus universi exercitus exsoluti sunt.

37. At Tiridates super proprias clientelas ope Vologesi fratris adiutus, non furtim iam, sed palam bello infensare Armeniam, quosque fidos nobis rebatur, depopulari, et si copiae contra ducerentur, eludere hucque et illuc volitans plura fama quam pugna exterrere. igitur Corbulo quaesito diu proelio frustra habitus et exemplo hostium circumferre bellum coactus, dispertit vires, ut legati praefectique diversos locos pariter invaderent; simul regem Antiochum monet proximas sibi praefecturas petere. nam Pharasmanes interfecto filio Radamisto quasi proditore, quo fidem in nos testaretur, vetus adversus Armenios odium promptius exercebat. tuncque primum inlecti Moschi, gens ante alias socia Romanis, avia Armeniae incursavit. ita consilia Tiridati in contrarium vertebant, mittebatque oratores, qui suo Parthorumque nomine expostularent, cur datis nuper obsidibus reintegrataque amicitia, quae novis quoque beneficiis locum aperiret, vetere Armeniae possessione depelleretur. ideo nondum ipsum Vologesen commotum, quia causa quam vi agere mallet: sin perstaretur in bello, non defore Arsacidis virtutem fortunamque saepius iam clade Romana expertam. ad ea Corbulo, satis comperto Vologesen defectione Hyrcaniae attineri, saudet Tiridati precibus Caesarem adgredi: posse illi regnum stabile et res incruentas contingere, si omissa spe longinqua et sera praesentem potioreque sequeretur.

38. Placitum dehinc, quia commeantibus in vicem nuntiis nihil in summam pacis proficiebatur, conloquio ipsorum tempus locumque destinari. mille equitum praesidium Tiridates adfore sibi dicebat: quantum Corbuloni cuiusque generis militum adsisteret, non statuere, dum positis loriceis et galeis in faciem pacis veniretur. cuicumque mortalium, nedum veteri et provido duci, barbarae astutiae patuissent: ideo artum inde numerum finiri et hinc maiorem offerri, ut dolus pararetur; nam equiti sagittarum usu exercito si detecta corpora obicerentur, nihil profuturam multitudinem. dissimulato tamen intellectu rectius de iis, quae in publicum consulerentur, totis exercitibus coram dissertaturos respondit. locum-

que delegit, cuius pars altera colles erant clementer adsurgentes accipiendis pedum ordinibus, pars in planitiem porrigebatur ad explicandas equitum turmas. dieque pacto prior Corbulo socias cohortes et auxilia regum pro cornibus, medio sextam legionem constituit, cui accita per noctem aliis ex castris tria milia tertianorum permiscuerat, una cum aquila, quasi eadem legio spectaretur. Tiridates vergente iam die procul adstitit, unde videri magis quam audiri posset. ita sine congressu dux Romanus abscedere militem sua quemque in castra iubet.

39. Rex sive fraudem suspectans, quia plura simul in loca ibatur, sive ut commeatus nostros Pontico mari et Trapezunte oppido adventantes interciperet, propere discedit. sed neque commeatibus vim facere potuit, quia per montes ducebantur praesidiis nostris insessos, et Corbulo, ne inritum bellum traheretur utque Armenios ad sua defendenda cogeret, excindere parat castella, sibi quod validissimum in ea praefectura, cognomento Vollandum, sumit; minora Cornelio Flacco legato et Insteio Capitoni castrorum praefecto mandat. tum circumspectis munimentis et quae expugnationi idonea provisus, hortatur milites, ut hostem vagum neque paci aut proelio paratum, sed perfidiam et ignaviam fuga confitentem exuerent sedibus gloriaeque pariter et praedae consularent. tum quadripertito exercitu hos in testudinem conglobatos subruendo vallo inducit, alios scalas moenibus admoovere, multos tormentis faces et hastas incutere iubet. libritoribus funditoribusque attributus locus, unde eminus glandes torquerent, ne qua pars subsidium laborantibus ferret pari undique metu. tantus inde ardor certantis exercitus fuit, ut intra tertiam diei partem nudati propugnatoribus muri, obices portarum subversi, capta escensu munimenta omnesque puberes trucidati sint, nullo milite amisso, paucis admodum vulneratis. et inbelle vulgus sub corona venundatum, reliqua praeda victoribus cessit. pari fortuna legatus ac praefectus usi sunt, tribusque una die castellis expugnatis cetera terrore et alia sponte incolarum in deditionem veniebant. unde orta fiducia caput gentis Artaxata adgrediendi. nec tamen proximo itinere ductae legiones, quae si amnem Araxen, qui moenia adluit, ponte transgrederentur, sub ictum dabantur: procul et latioribus vadis transiere.

40. At Tiridates pudore et metu, ne, si concessisset obsidioni, nihil opis in ipso videretur, si prohiberet, inpeditis locis seque et equestres copias inligaret, statuit postremo ostendere aciem et dato die proelium incipere vel simulatione fugae locum fraudi parare. igitur repente agmen Romanum circumfundit, non ignaro duce nostro, qui viae pariter et pugnae composuerat exercitum. latere dextro tertia legio, sinistro sexta incedebat, mediis decumanorum delectis; recepta inter ordines impedimenta, et tergum mille equites tuebantur, quibus iusserat, ut instantibus comminus resisterent, refugos non sequerentur. in cornibus pedes sagittarius et cetera manus equitum ibat, productiore [cornu] sinistro per ima collium, ut, si hostis intravisset, fronte simul et sinu exciperetur. adsultare ex diverso Tiridates, non usque ad ictum teli, sed tum minitans, tum specie trepidantis, si laxare ordines et diversos consecari posset. ubi nihil temeritate solutum, nec amplius quam decurio equitum audentius progressus et sagittis confixus ceteros ad obsequium exemplo firmaverat, propinquis iam tenebris abcessit.

41. Et Corbulo castra in loco metatus, an expeditis legionibus nocte Artaxata pergeret obsidioque circumdaret agitavit, concessisse illuc Tiridaten ratus. dein postquam exploratores attulere longinquum regis iter et Medi an Albani peterentur incertum, lucem opperitur, praemissaque levis armatura, quae muros interim ambiret oppugnationemque eminus inciperet. sed oppidani portis sponte patefactis se suaque Romanis permisere, quod salutem ipsis tulit: Artaxatis ignis inmissus deletaque et solo aequata sunt, quia nec teneri *poterant* sine valido praesidio ob magnitudinem moenium, nec id nobis virium erat, quod firmando praesidio et capessendo bello divideretur, vel si integra et incustodita relinquerentur, nulla in eo utilitas aut gloria, quod capta essent. adicitur miraculum velut numine oblatum: nam cuncta Artaxatis tenus sole inlustrata fuere; quod moenibus cingebatur, repente ita atra nube coopertum fulguribusque discretum est, ut quasi infensantibus deis exitio tradi crederetur.

XIV. 23. At Corbulo post deleta Artaxata utendum recenti terrore ratus ad occupanda Tigranocerta, quibus excisis metum hostium intenderet vel, si pepercisset, clementiae famam adipisceretur, illuc pergit, non inenso exercitu, ne spem veniae auferret, neque tamen remissa cura, gnarus facilem mutatu gentem, ut segnem ad pericula, ita infidam ad occasiones. barbari, pro ingenio quisque, alii preces offerre, quidam deserere vicos et in avia digredi; ac fuere qui se speluncis et carissima secum abderent. igitur dux Romanus diversis artibus, misericordia adversus supplices, celeritate adversus profugos, inimitis iis, qui latebras insederant, ora et exitus specuum sarmentis virgultisque completos igni exurit. atque illum fines suos praegredientem incursavere Mardi, latrociniiis exerciti contraque inrumpentem montibus defensi; quos Corbulo inmissis Hiberis vastavit hostilemque audaciam externo sanguine ultus est.

- 24. Ipse exercitusque ut nullis ex proelio damnis, ita per inopiam et labores fatiscabant, carne pecudum propulsare famem adacti. ad hoc penuria aquae, fervida aestas, longinqua itinera sola ducis patientia mitigabantur, eadem pluraque gregario milite tolerantis. ventum dehinc in locos cultos demessaeque segetes, et ex duobus castellis, in quae confugerant Armenii, alterum impetu captum; qui primam vim depulerant, obsidione coguntur. unde in regionem Tauraunium transgressus inprovisum periculum vitavit. nam haud procul tentorio eius non ignobilis barbarus cum telo repertus ordinem insidiarum seque auctorem et socios per tormenta edidit, convictique et puniti sunt qui specie amicitiae dolum parabant. nec multo post legati Tigranocerta missi patere moenia adferunt, intentos popularis ad iussa: simul hospitale donum, coronam auream, tradebant. accepitque cum honore, nec quicquam urbi detractum, quo promptius obsequium integri retinerent.

25. At praesidium Legerda, quod ferox iuventus clauserat, non sine certamine expugnatum est: nam et proelium pro muris ausi erant et pulsi intra munimenta aggeri demum et inrumpentium armis cessere. quae facilius proveniebant, quia Parthi Hyrcano bello distinebantur. miserant que Hyrcani ad principem Romanum societatem oratum, attineri a se Vologesen pro pignore amicitiae ostentantes. eos regredientes Corbulo, ne Euphraten transgressi hostium custodiis circum-

venirentur, dato praesidio ad litora maris rubri deduxit, unde vitatis Parthorum finibus patrias in sedes remeavere.

26. Quin et Tiridaten per Medos extrema Armeniae intrantem, praemisso cum auxiliis Verulano legato atque ipse legionibus citis, abire procul ac spem belli amittere subegit; quosque nobis aversos animis cognoverat, caedibus et incendiis perpopulatus possessionem Armeniae usurpabat, cum advenit Tigranes a Nerone ad capessendum imperium delectus, Cappadocum ex nobilitate, regis Archelai nepos, sed quod diu obses apud urbem fuerat, usque ad servilem patientiam dimissus. nec consensu acceptus, durante apud quosdam favore Arsacidarum. at plerique superbiam Parthorum perosi datum a Romanis regem malebant. additum ei praesidium mille legionarii, tres sociorum cohortes duaeque equitum alae, et quo facilius novum regnum tueretur, partes Armeniae, ut cuique finitima, Pharasmani Polemonique et Aristobulo atque Antiocho parere iussae sunt. Corbulo in Suriam abscessit, morte Ummidii legati vacuum ac sibi permissam.

XV. 1. Interea rex Parthorum Vologesēs cognitis Corbulonis rebus regemque alienigenam Tigranen Armeniae impositum, simul fratre Tiridate pulso spreto Arsacidarum fastigium ire ultum volens, magnitudine rursus Romana et continui foederis reverentia diversas ad curas trahebatur, cunctator ingenio et defectione Hyrcanorum, gentis validae, multisque ex eo bellis inligatus. atque illum ambiguum novus insuper nuntius contumeliae exstimulat: quippe egressus Armenia Tigranes Adiabenos, conterminam nationem, latius ac diutius quam per latrocinia vastaverat, idque primores gentium aegre tolerabant: eo contemptiois descensum, ut ne duce quidem Romano incursarentur, sed temeritate obsidis tot per annos inter mancipia habiti. accendebat dolorem eorum Monobazus, quem penes Adiabenum regimen, quod praesidium aut unde peteret rogians. iam de Armenia concessum, proxima trahi; et nisi defendant Parthi, levius servitium apud Romanos deditis quam captis esse. Tiridates quoque regni profugus per silentium aut modice querendo gravior erat: non enim ignavia magna imperia contineri; virorum armorumque faciendum certamen; id in summa fortuna aequius quod validius, et sua retinere privatae domus, de alienis certare regiam laudem esse.

2. Igitur commotus his Vologesēs concilium vocat et proximum sibi Tiridaten constituit atque ita orditur: 'hunc ego eodem mecum patre genitum, cum mihi per aetatem summo nomine concessisset, in possessionem Armeniae deduxi, qui tertius potentiae gradus habetur: nam Medos Pacorus ante ceperat. videbarque contra vetera fratrum odia et certamina familiae nostrae penates rite composuisse. prohibent Romani et pacem numquam ipsis prospere lacessitam nunc quoque in exitium suum abrupunt. non ibo infitias: aequitate quam sanguine, causa quam armis retinere parta maioribus malueram. si cunctatione deliqui, virtute corrigam. vestra quidem vis et gloria *in* integro est, addita modestiae fama, quae neque summis mortalium spernenda est et a dis aestimatur'. simul diademate caput Tiridatis evinxit, promptam equitum manum, quae regem ex more sectatur, Monaesi nobili viro tradidit, adiectis Abiabenorum auxiliis, mandavitque Ti-

granen Armenia exturbare, dum ipse positus adversus Hyrcanos discordiis vires intimas molemque belli ciet, provinciis Romanis minitans.

3. Quae ubi Corbuloni certis nuntiis audita sunt, legiones duas cum Verulano Severo et Vettio Bolano subsidium Tigrani mittit, occulto praecepto, compositus cuncta quam festinantius agerent: quippe bellum habere quam gerere malebat. Scripseratque Caesari proprio duce opus esse, qui Armeniam defenderet: Suriam ingruente Vologese acriore in discrimine esse. atque interim reliquas legiones pro ripa Euphratis locat, tumultuariam provincialium manum armat, hostiles ingressus praesidiis intercipit. et quia egena aquarum regio est, castella fontibus inposita; quosdam rivos congestu harenae abdidit.

4. Ea dum a Corbulone tuendae Suriae parantur, acto raptim agmine Monaeses, ut famam sui praeiret, non ideo nescium aut incautum Tigranem offendit. occupaverat Tigranocertam, urbem copia defensorum et magnitudine moenium validam. ad hoc Nicephorius amnis haud spernenda latitudine partem murorum ambit, et ducta ingens fossa, qua fluvio diffidebatur. inerantque milites et provisi ante commeatus, quorum subvectu pauci avidius progressi et repentinis hostibus circumventi ira magis quam metu ceteros accenderant. sed Partho ad exsequendas obsidiones nulla comminus audacia: raris sagittis neque clausos exterret et semet frustratur. Adiabeni cum promovere scalas et machinamenta inciperent, facile detrusi, mox erumpentibus nostris caeduntur.

5. Corbulo tamen, quamvis secundis rebus suis, moderandum fortunae ratus misit ad Vologesen, qui expostularent vim provinciae inlatam: socium amicumque regem, cohortes Romanas circumsideri. omitteret potius obsidionem, aut se quoque in agro hostili castra positurum. Casperius centurio in eam legationem delectus apud oppidum Nisibin, septem et triginta milibus passuum a Tigranocerta distantem, adiit regem et mandata ferociter edidit. Vologesi vetus et penitus infixum erat arma Romana vitandi, nec praesentia prospere fluebant. inritum obsidium, tutus manu et copiis Tigranes, fugati qui expugnationem sumpserant, missae in Armeniam legiones, et aliae pro Suria paratae ultro inrumpere; sibi inbecillum equitem pabuli inopia: nam exorta vis locustarum ambederat quidquid herbidum aut frondosum. igitur metu abstruso mitiora obtendens, missurum ad imperatorem Romanum legatos super petenda Armenia et firmanda pace respondet. Monaesen omittere Tigranocertam iubet, ipse retro concedit.

6. Haec plures ut formidine regis et Corbulonis minis patrata ac magnifica extollebant: alii occulte pepigisse interpretabantur, ut omisso utrimque bello et abeunte Vologese Tigranes quoque Armenia abscederet. cur enim exercitum Romanum a Tigranocertis deductum? cur deserta per otium quae bello defenderant? an melius hibernavisse in extrema Cappadocia, raptim erectis tuguriis, quam in sede regni modo retenti? dilata prorsus arma, ut Vologeses cum alio quam cum Corbulone certaret, Corbulo merita tot per annos gloriae non ultra periculum faceret. nam, ut rettuli, proprium ducem tuendae Armeniae poposcerat et adventare Caesennius Paetus audiebatur. iamque aderat, copiis ita divisis, ut quarta et duodecima legiones addita quinta, quae recens e Moesis excita erat, simul Pontica et Galatarum Cappadocumque auxilia Paeto oboedirent, tertia et

sexta et decuma legiones priorque Suriae miles apud Corbulonem manerent; cetera ex rerum usu sociarent partirenturve. sed neque Corbulo aemuli patiens, et Paetus, cui satis ad gloriam erat, si proximus haberetur, despiciebat gesta, nihil caedis aut praedae, usurpatae nomine tenus urbium expugnationes dictitans: se tributa ac leges et pro umbra regis Romanum ius victis impositurum.

7. Sub idem tempus legati Vologesis, quos ad principem missos memoravi, revertere inriti bellumque propalam sumptum a Parthis. nec Paetus detrectavit, sed duabus legionibus, quarum quartam Funisulanus Vettonianus eo in tempore, duodecimum Calavius Sabinus regebant, Armeniam intrat tristi omine. nam in transgressu Euphratis, quem ponte tramittebant, nulla palam causa turbatus equus, qui consularia insignia gestabat, retro evasit. hostiaque, quae muniebantur, hibernaculis adsistens semifacta opera fuga perrupit seque vallo extulit. et pila militum arsere, magis insigni prodigio, quia Parthus hostis missilibus telis decertat.

8. Ceterum Paetus spretis ominibus, necdum satis firmatis hibernaculis, nullo rei frumentariae provisu, rapit exercitum trans montem Taurum recipiendis, ut ferebat, Tigranocertis vastandisque regionibus, quas Corbulo integras omisisset. et capta quaedam castella, gloriaeque et praedae nonnihil partum, si aut gloriam cum modo aut praedam cum cura habuisset. longinquis itineribus percursando quae obtineri nequibant, corrupto qui captus erat commeatu et instante iam hieme, reduxit exercitum composuitque ad Caesarem litteras quasi confecto bello, verbis magnificis, rerum vacuas.

9. Interim Corbulo numquam neglectam Euphratis ripam crebrioribus praesidiis insedit; et ne ponti iniciendo impedimentum hostiles turmae adferrent (iam enim subiectis campis magna specie volitabant), naves magnitudine praestantes et conexas trabibus ac turribus auctas agit per amnem catapultisque et balistis proturbat barbaros, in quos saxa et hastae longius permeabant, quam ut contrario sagittarum iactu adaequarentur. dein pons continuatus collesque adversi per socias cohortes, post legionum castris occupantur, tanta celeritate et ostentatione virium, ut Parthi omisso paratu invadendae Suriae spem omnem in Armeniam verterent, ubi Paetus imminentium nescius quintam legionem procul in Ponto habebat, reliquas promiscis militum commeatibus infirmaverat, donec adventare Vologesen magno et infenso agmine auditum.

10. Accitit legio duodecima, et unde famam aucti exercitus speraverat, prodita infrequentia, qua tamen retineri castra et eludi Parthus tractu belli poterat, si Paeto aut in suis aut in alienis consiliis constantia fuisset: verum ubi a viris militaribus adversus urgentes casus firmatus erat, rursus, ne alienae sententiae indigens videretur, in diversa ac deteriora transibat. et tunc relictis hibernis non fossam neque vallum sibi, sed corpora et arma in hostem data clamitans, duxit legiones quasi proelio certaturus. deinde amisso centurione et paucis militibus, quos visendis hostium copiis praemiserat, trepidus remeavit. et quia minus acriter Vologeses institerat, vana rursus fiducia tria milia delecti peditis proximo Tauri iugo imposuit, quo transitum regis arcerent; alares quoque Pannonios, robur equitatus, in parte campi locat. coniunx ac filius castello, cui Arsamosata

nomen est, abditi, data in praesidium cohorte ac disperso milite, qui in uno habitus vagum hostem promptius sustentavisset. aegre compulsum ferunt, ut instantem Corbuloni fateretur. nec a Corbulone properatum, quo gliscentibus periculis etiam subsidii laus augeretur. expediri tamen itineri singula milia ex tribus legionibus et alarios octingentos, parem numerum e cohortibus iussit.

11. At Vologeses, quamvis obsessa a Paeto itinera hinc peditatu inde equite accepisset, nihil mutato consilio, sed vi ac minis alares exterruit, legionarios obtrevit, uno tantum centurione Tarquitio Crescente turrim, in qua praesidium agitabat, defendere auso factaque saepius eruptione et caesis, qui barbarorum propius suggrediebantur, donec ignium iactu circumveniretur. peditum si quis integer longinqua et avia, vulnerati castra repetivere, virtutem regis, saevitiam et copias gentium, cuncta metu extollentes, facili credulitate eorum, qui eadem pavebant. ne dux quidem obniti adversis, sed cuncta militiae munia deseruerat, missis iterum ad Corbulonem precibus, veniret propere, signa et aquilas et nomen reliquum infelicis exercitus tueretur: se fidem interim, donec vita subpeditet, retenturos.

12. Ille interritus et parte copiarum apud Suriam relictā, ut munimenta Euphrati inposita retinerentur, qua proximum et com meatibus non egenum, regionem Commagenam, exim Cappadociam, inde Armenios petivit. comitabantur exercitum praeter alia sueta bello magna vis camelorum onusta frumenti, ut simul hostem famemque depelleret. primum e percussis Paccium primi pili centurionem obvium habuit, dein plerosque militum; quos diversas fugae causas obtendentes redire ad signa et clementiam Paeti experiri monebat: se nisi victoribus immitem esse. simul suas legiones adire, hortari, priorum admonere, novam gloriam ostendere. non vicos aut oppida Armeniorum, sed castra Romana duasque in iis legiones pretium laboris peti. si singulis manipularibus praecipua servati civis corona imperatoria manu tribueretur, quod illud et quantum decus, ubi par eorum numerus aspiceretur, qui adtulissent salutem et qui accepissent! his atque talibus in commune alacres (et erant quos pericula fratrum aut propinquorum propriis stimulis incenderent) continuum diu noctuque iter properabant.

13. Eoque intentius Vologeses premere obsessos, modo vallum legionum, modo castellum, quo inbellis aetas defendebatur, adpugnare, propius incedens quam mos Parthis, si ea temeritate hostem in proelium eliceret. at illi vix contuberniis extracti, nec aliud quam munimenta propugnabant, pars iussu ducis, et alii propria ignavia aut Corbulonem opperientes, ac vis si ingrueret, provisis exemplis *cladis* Caudinae Numantinaeque; neque eandem vim Samnitibus, Italico populo, ac Parthis, Romani imperii aemulis. validam quoque et laudatam antiquitatem, quotiens fortuna contra daret, saluti consuluisse. qua desperatione exercitus dux subactus primas tamen litteras ad Vologesen non supplices, sed in modum querentis composuit, quod pro Armeniis semper Romanae dicionis aut subiectis regi, quem imperator delegisset, hostilia faceret: pacem ex aequo utilem; ne praesentia tantum spectaret. ipsum adversus duas legiones totis regni viribus advenisse: at Romanis orbem terrarum reliquum, quo bellum iuarent.

14. Ad ea Vologeses nihil pro causa, sed opperendos sibi fratres Pacorum ac Tiridaten rescripsit; illum locum tempusque consilio destinatum, quid de Armenia



cernerent; adiecisse deos dignum Arsacidarum, simul ut de legionibus Romanis statuerent. missi posthac Paeto nuntii et regis conloquium petitum, qui Vasacen praefectum equitatus ire iussit. tum Paetus Lucullos, Pompeios et si qua Caesares optinendae donandae Armeniae egerant, Vasaces imaginem retinendi largiendive penes nos, vim penes Parthos memorat. et multum in vicem disceptato, Monobazus Adiabenus in diem posterum testis iis quae pepigissent adhibetur. placuitque liberari obsidio legiones et decedere omnem militem finibus Armeniorum castellaque et commeatus Parthis tradi, quibus perpetratis copia Vologesi fieret mittendi ad Neronem legatos.

15. Interim flumini Arsaniae (is castra praefluebat) pontem imposuit, specie sibi illud iter expedientis, sed Parthi quasi documentum victoriae iusserant; namque iis usui fuit, nostri per diversum iere. addidit rumor sub iugum missas legiones et alia ex rebus infaustis, quorum simulacrum ab Armeniis usurpatum est. namque et munimenta ingressi sunt, antequam agmen Romanum excederet, et circumstetere vias, captiva olim mancipia aut iumenta adgnoscentes abstrahentesque: raptae etiam vestes, retenta arma, pavido milite et concedente, ne qua proelii causa existeret. Vologeses armis et corporibus caesorum aggeratis, quo cladem nostram testaretur, visu fugientium legionum abstinuit: fama moderationis quaerebatur, postquam superbiam expleverat. flumen Arsaniam elephanto insidens, proximus quisque regem vi equorum perrupere, quia rumor incesserat pontem cessurum oneri dolo fabricantium: sed qui ingredi ausi sunt, validum et fidum intellexere.

16. Ceterum obsessis adeo suppeditavisse rem frumentariam constitit, ut horreis ignem inicerent, contraque prodiderit Corbulo Parthos inopes copiarum et pabulo attrito relicturos oppugnationem, neque se plus tridui itinere afuisse. adicit iure iurando Paeti cautum apud signa, adstantibus iis, quos testificando rex misisset, neminem Romanum Armeniam ingressurum, donec referrentur litterae Neronis, an paci adnueret. quae ut augendae infamiae composita, sic reliqua non in obscuro habentur, una die quadraginta milium spatium emensum esse Paetum, desertis passim sauciis, neque minus deformem illam fugientium trepidationem, quam si terga in acie vertissent. Corbulo cum suis copiis apud ripam Euphratis obviis non eam speciem insignium et armorum praetulit, ut diversitatem exprobraret. maesti manipuli ac vicem commilitonum miserantes ne lacrimis quidem temperare; vix prae fletu usurpata consalutatio. decesserat certamen virtutis et ambitio gloriae, felicitum hominum adfectus: sola misericordia valebat, et apud minores magis.

17. Ducum inter se brevis sermo secutus est, hoc conquerente iam inritum laborem, potuisse bellum fuga Parthorum finiri: ille integra utrique cuncta respondit: converterent aquilas et iuncti invaderent Armeniam abscessu Vologesis infirmatam. non ea imperatoris habere mandata Corbulo: periculo legionum commotum e provincia egressum; quando in incerto habeantur Parthorum conatus, Suriam repetiturum: sic quoque optimam fortunam orandam, ut pedes confectus spatiis itinerum alacrem et facilitate camporum praevenientem equitem adsequeretur. exim Paetus per Cappadociam hibernavit: at Vologesis ad Cor-

bulonem missi nuntii, detraheret castella trans Euphraten amnemque, ut olim, medium faceret. ille Armeniam quoque diversis praesidiis vacuum fieri exposulabat. et postremo concessit rex; dirutaque quae Euphraten ultra communiverat Corbulo, et Armenii sine arbitro relictis sunt.

24. Inter quae veris principio legati Parthorum mandata regis Vologesis litterasque in eandem formam attulere: se priora et totiens iactata super optinenda Armenia nunc omittere, quoniam di, quamvis potentium populorum arbitri, possessionem Parthis non sine ignominia Romana tradidissent. nuper clausum Tigranem; post Paetum legionesque, cum opprimere posset, incolumes dimissis. satis adprobatam vim; datum et lenitatis experimentum. nec recusaturum Tiridaten accipiendi diademati in urbem venire, nisi sacerdotii religione attineretur. iturum ad signa et effigies principis, ubi legionibus coram regnum auspicaretur.

25. Talibus Vologesis litteris, quia Paetus diversa tamquam rebus integris scribebat, interrogatus centurio, qui cum legatis advenerat, quo in statu Armenia esset, omnes inde Romanos excessisse respondit. tum intellecto barbarum inrisu, qui peterent quod eripuerant, consuluit inter primores civitatis Nero, bellum anceps an pax inhonesta placeret. nec dubitatum de bello. et Corbulo militum atque hostium tot per annos gnarus gerendae rei praeficitur, ne cuius alterius inscitia rursum peccaretur, quia Paeti piguerat. igitur inriti remittuntur, cum donis tamen, unde spes fieret non frustra eadem oraturum Tiridaten, si preces ipse attulisset. Suriaeque executio C. Cestio, copiae militares Corbuloni permisae, et quinta decuma legio ducente Mario Celso e Pannonia adiecta est. scribitur tetrarchis ac regibus praefectisque et procuratoribus et qui praetorum finitimas provincias regebant, iussis Corbulonis obsequi, in tantum ferme modum aucta potestate, quem populus Romanus Cn. Pompeio bellum piraticum gesturo dederat. regressum Paetum, cum graviora metueret, facetiis insectari satis habuit Caesar, his ferme verbis: ignoscere se statim, ne tam promptus in pavorem longiore sollicitudine aegresceret.

26. At Corbulo quarta et duodecima legionibus, quae fortissimo quoque amisso et ceteris exterritis parum habiles proelio videbantur, in Suriam translatis, sextam inde ac tertiam legiones, integrum militem et crebris ac prosperis laboribus exercitum, in Armeniam ducit. addiditque legionem quintam, quae per Pontum agens expers cladis fuerat, simul quintadecumanos recens adductos et vexilla delectorum ex Illyrico et Aegypto, quodque alarum cohortiumque, et auxilia regum in unum conducta apud Melitenen, qua transmittere Euphraten parabat. tum lustratum rite exercitum ad contionem vocat orditurque magnifica de auspiciis imperatoris rebusque a se gestis, adversa in inscitiam Paeti declinans, multa auctoritate, quae viro militari pro facundia erat.

27. Mox iter L. Lucullo quondam penetratum, apertis quae vetustas obsaeperat, pergit. et venientes Tiridatis Vologesisque de pace legatos haud aspernatus, adiungit iis centuriones cum mandatis non inimitibus: nec enim adhuc eo ventum, ut certamine extremo opus esset. multa Romanis secunda, quaedam Parthis evenisse, documento adversus superbiam. proinde et Tiridati conducere intactum vastationibus regnum dono accipere, et Vologesen melius societate

Romana quam damnis mutuis genti Parthorum consulturum. scire, quantum intus discordiarum quamque indomitas et praeferoces nationes regeret: contra imperatori suo immotam ubique pacem et unum id bellum esse. simul consilio terrorem adicere, et megistanas Armenios, qui primi a nobis defecerant, pellit sedibus, castella eorum excindit, plana edita, validos invalidosque pari metu complet.

28. Non infensum nec cum hostili odio Corbulonis nomen etiam barbaris habebatur, eoque consilium eius fidum credebant. ergo Vologeses neque atrox in summam, et quibusdam praefecturis indutias petit: Tiridates locum diemque conloquio poscit. tempus propinquum, locus, in quo nuper obsessae cum Paeto legiones erant, cum barbaris delectus esset ob memoriam laetioris sibi rei, Corbulo non vitavit, ut dissimilitudo fortunae gloriam augeret. neque infamia Paetiangebatur, quod eo maxime patuit, quia filio eius tribuno ducere manipulos atque operire reliquias malae pugnae imperavit. die pacta Tiberius Alexander, inlustris eques Romanus, minister bello datus, et Vinicianus Annius, gener Corbulonis, nondum senatoria aetate, set pro legato quintae legioni inpositus, in castra Tiridatis venire, honori eius ac ne metueret insidias tali pignore; viceni dehinc equites adsumpti. et viso Corbulone rex prior equo desiluit; nec cunctatus Corbulo, sed pedes uterque dexteram miscuere.

29. Exim Romanus laudat iuvenem omissis praecipitibus tuta et salutaria capessentem. ille de nobilitate generis multum praefatus, cetera temperanter adiungit: iturum quippe Romam laturumque novum Caesari decus, non adversis Parthorum rebus supplicem Arsaciden. tum placuit Tiridaten ponere apud effigiem Caesaris insigne regium nec nisi manu Neronis resumere; et conloquium osculo finitum. dein paucis diebus interiectis, magna utrimque specie, inde eques compositus per turmas et insignibus patriis, hinc agmina legionum stetero fulgentibus aquilis signisque et simulacris deum in modum templi: medio tribunal sedem curulem et sedes effigiem Neronis sustinebat. ad quam progressus Tiridates, caesis ex more victimis, sublatum capiti diadema imagini subiecit, magnis apud cunctos animorum motibus, quos augebat insita adhuc oculis exercituum Romanorum caedes aut obsidio. at nunc versos casus: iturum Tiridaten ostentui gentibus, quanto minus quam captivum?

30. Addidit gloriae Corbulo comitatem epulasque; et rogitante rege causas, quotiens novum aliquid adverterat, ut initia vigiliarum per centurionem nuntiari, convivium bucina dimitti et structam ante augurale aram subdita face accendi, cuncta in maius attollens admiratione prisca moris adfecit. postero die spatium oravit, quo tantum itineris aditurus fratres ante matremque viseret; obsidem interea filiam tradit litterasque supplices ad Neronem.

31. Et digressus Pacorum apud Medos, Vologesen Ecbatanis repperit, non incuriosum fratris: quippe et propriis nuntiis a Corbulone petierat, ne quam imaginem servitii Tiridates perferret neu ferrum traderet aut complexu provincias optinentium arceretur foribusve eorum adsisteret, tantusque ei Romae quantus consulibus honor esset. scilicet externa superbiae sueto non inerat notitia nostri, apud quos vis imperii valet, inania tramittuntur.

The first account of Corbulo we have is that of his campaign against the Chauci, who were ravaging the Gauls. He enters his province *magna cum cura et mox gloria*. In the second sentence of this opening passage we have a direct characterization of the general in the way in which he enters the province. The author wishes his readers to feel that this general is not a man who will be caught off his guard, but that success will attend him. The words *mox gloria*<sup>1</sup> point to the narration of such events as will add to this man's praise, and if we keep this in mind I think that some of the difficulties of interpreting the Corbulo episode will find an explanation. The term "gloria" is often used of a man who has attained some distinction, or as a worthy goal toward which he strives. It is used several times of Corbulo, and always in a commendatory way. The expression is applied repeatedly to Agricola<sup>2</sup> in the monograph which bears his name, and which has been shown to be an encomiastic treatise.<sup>3</sup>

After a brief account of the preparation of boats on the Rhine, and of the destruction of the barbarian rafts, the narrative at once turns to a more detailed description of the military discipline of Corbulo. He at first led back the army, idle and delighting in plundering, to the old custom and would allow no one to depart from the line nor enter into a fight unless ordered. Discipline in an army is always commendable, and while we do not know what the *morale* of the army was when Corbulo took command, the implication is that discipline had been broken down, and it is to Corbulo's praise that he restored it *veterem ad morem*. When we bear in mind that to the Romans everything old was best, and that the ideals were to be found in the past, this phrase has special significance. Corbulo brings the discipline up to the best standard and the conclusion must be that in this respect he is one of the best generals.

Corbulo's strict disciplinary power is further illustrated by the account of one man being put to death because he was digging a trench without side arms, and another because he was girded merely with a dagger. This story, whether true or false, Tacitus says, had its origin in the severity of the leader. It also serves to show why men believed that he, whose reputation for harshness towards slight offenses was such, was strict and inexorable in the case of great evils. At this point I believe Tacitus expresses his dissent from his source. He found that the author he was following, in

<sup>1</sup> xi. 18.

<sup>2</sup> "Intravit animum (Agricolae) militaris gloriae cupido."—Chap. 5. "Mox et gloriam communicabat."—Chap. 8. "Sic Agricola simul suis virtutibus, simul vitiis aliorum in ipsam gloriam praecepta agebatur."—Chap. 41.

<sup>3</sup> G. L. Hendrickson *The Proconsulate of Julius Agricola*.

order to show the disciplinary power of Corbulo, had so exaggerated an incident that he could not believe it, and so he says that, whether true or false, the story had its origin in the severity of the leader. As a fact of history, this incident is of minor importance, but as an element of characterization it serves excellently to bring out the quality of the general as a stern disciplinarian. Further emphasis is added to the idea by showing that the course of Corbulo was commendable from the results that followed. These were two: *nos virtutem auximus*, and *barbari ferociam infregere*.

A passing notice is given to the Frisii, and this adds to the praise of Corbulo by showing his ability to govern in a civil as well as a military capacity. He imposed upon the natives a senate, magistrates, and laws, and took proper precaution that they should not throw off his commands. He sent men to induce the Greater Chauci to surrender, and he assailed Gannascus with craft. The dark side of Gannascus is shown. He was said to be a *transfugam et violatorem fidei*.

Still by the death of Gannascus Corbulo was said to be affording the occasion of a rebellion. With most people, *apud plerosque*, his course of action was commendable; with certain ones, *apud quosdam*, it caused misgivings. For, they ask, why should he arouse the enemy? In case of defeat the misfortune would fall upon the State, the very thing which Corbulo would not want. But, on the other hand, suppose that he had been successful. In that case in the eyes of a prince who was *ignavus* he would be a dangerous man to the peace of a nation. This passage has been interpreted as a criticism of Tacitus on Corbulo, but I think Tacitus is following quite closely his source. In that the author was aware of some criticism of Corbulo's actions. It would have been something unusual for so prominent a man to escape criticism entirely. However, it was the majority who commended Corbulo. Even with "the certain ones," what is given in the text shows not so much criticism as it does their inability to understand the meaning of Corbulo's actions. Any other interpretation for the words, *cur hostem conciret?* *Adversa in rem publicam casura* is meaningless, when one takes into account the whole conduct of Corbulo. It is a question that shows perplexity in the mind. The words *sin prospere egisset formidolosum paci virum insignem et ignavo principem praegravem*, cannot be a criticism of Tacitus on Corbulo unless we are ready to admit one of two things, either that Tacitus criticizes him for his success which thereby endangers the peace, or else that he criticizes him for exposing himself to the danger of a base prince. The criticism for either course would be absurd. That the author felt that no blame was to be attached to Corbulo in this matter is shown by the way in which he represents Cor-

bulo's immediate withdrawal to this side of the Rhine when, so ordered by Claudius. Corbulo exacted strict obedience to his own commands. He knew how to obey his superior.<sup>4</sup> His greatness is shown in his obedience and this is emphasized by showing the embarrassing situation in which he was placed. For, it is said, there were pouring into his mind fear from the emperor, scorn from the barbarians, and mockery from among the allies. Yet he obeyed, saying only: *beatos quondam duces Romanos*.<sup>5</sup>

After his withdrawal across the Rhine Corbulo set his troops to digging a canal as a protection against the tides from the ocean in order that they might not become demoralized by inactivity. He received the insignia of a triumph, although the right to wage war had been denied him. If we look into the account in Tacitus for good reasons why the insignia should have been given him, we fail to find them. The idea most emphasized in these three chapters is the ability of Corbulo as a commander, and his obedience to orders from his superior even under trying circumstances. Did he deserve the insignia? Possibly he did, but the facts in the narration do not show it, and the explanation is that Tacitus' source was not concerned with the facts of history *per se*, but used them to bring out the meritorious qualities of the general.

Corbulo<sup>6</sup> is next mentioned in the encomiastic phrase: *videbaturque locus virtutibus patefactus*.<sup>7</sup> Now what opportunity would Corbulo have

<sup>4</sup> For a commendation of obedience to orders under analogous circumstances cf. Nepos *Ages.* 4: "qui cum victori praeesset exercitui maximamque haberet fiduciam regni Persarum potiundi. tanta modestia dicto audiens fuit iussis absentium magistratum, ut si privatus in comitio esset Spartae. cuius exemplum utinam imperatores nostri sequi voluissent."

<sup>5</sup> xi. 20. The account here describes the hard situation under which it was difficult to obey and thereby allows the character of Corbulo to reveal itself in his obedience, while in Cassius Dio lx. 30, the thought that his recall was due to the envy of Claudius is the rather emphasized. *τὴν τε γὰρ ἀρετὴν αὐτοῦ καὶ τὴν ἀσκησιν μαθὼν οὐκ ἐπέτρεψεν αὐτῷ ἐπὶ πλέον αὐξηθῆναι. πυνθόμενος δὲ τοῦτο ὁ Κορβούλων ἐπανήλθε, τοσοῦτον μόνον ἀναβόησας "ὦ μακάριοι ἰοὶ πάλοι ποτὲ στρατηγήσαντες" ἔσ' δῆλωσιν ὅτι τοῖς μὲν ἀκινδύως ἀνδραγαθίσθαι ἐξήν, αὐτὸς δ' ὑπὸ τοῦ αυτοκράτορος διὰ τὸν φθόνον ἐνεποδίσθη.*

<sup>6</sup> The account of Corbulo's campaign against the Chauci is given as taking place in the year 47. He has no new command until appointed by Nero in 54 to take charge of the situation in Armenia. What he was doing during this time we do not know. Henderson in *The Life and Principate of the Emperor Nero*, p. 165, says: "He stayed in Rome, amusing the Senate by his bluntness of speech, until about the year A.D. 51 he was sent to govern the rich and peaceful province of Asia." But in all these years from 47 to 54 we do not have a single mention of him in Tacitus. When he is again brought to our attention in xiii. 8, it is in connection with his appointment to have charge of the war against the Parthians.

<sup>7</sup> The translator in Bohn's Library renders thus: "it seemed to open a place and standing for virtue." This makes the statement a general one. But obviously it refers

had of showing the *virtutes* of a general during the years of quiet between his campaign against the Chauci and his appointment to command in the East? None whatever. The *virtutibus* refer to Corbulo's success in Germany and to his military discipline, and so are to be taken in close connection therewith. This is further shown by the phrase *per recentem gloriam*.<sup>8</sup> This is given as one of the reasons why the hostages given by Vologeses preferred Corbulo to Quadratus. Corbulo having no command during those seven or eight years of inactivity could have won no victory, and a victory won seven years before is too old to speak of as *recentem*. The explanation is to be found in the author's disregard for chronology, as I have shown above. Not finding anything in this period which he cares to record, and not concerned with a time element, he makes the *recentem victoriam* refer back to the German campaign.

The narrative of these two chapters<sup>9</sup> is highly encomiastic. After Corbulo's appointment and a statement of the division of the troops we have the phrase: *sed studia eorum in Corbulonem promptiora*. Again, when the question of choosing between Corbulo and Quadratus is left to the hostages they choose the former: *per recentem gloriam et inclinatione quadam etiam hostium Corbulonem praeferere*. Preference was again shown for Corbulo when Quadratus heard that he was coming and hastened to Cilicia: *ne, si ad accipiendas copias Suriam intravisset Corbulo, omnium ora in se verteret*. This preference was due to Corbulo's being *corpore ingens, verbis magnificis et super experientiam sapientiamque etiam specie inanum validus*. Physical qualities are one of the things enumerated by the rhetoricians to be praised.<sup>10</sup>

The phrase *verbis magnificis* has been interpreted as a criticism of Tacitus on Corbulo, but the author simply meant to express by it the eloquence of the general as one of the many good qualities possessed by him and which he is here enumerating.

The sending of instructions to Vologeses by both Corbulo and Quadratus to maintain the usual relations toward the Roman Empire and the directly to the "virtutes" of Corbulo and this view is supported by Dio lxii. 19, where he says: ὁμοία γὰρ δὴ τοῖς πρώτοις Ῥωμαίων, οὐχ ὅτι τῷ γένει λαμπρὸς ἢ τῷ σώματι ἰσχυρὸς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ ἀρτίφων ἦν καὶ πολὺ μὲν τὸ ἀνδρεῖον πολὺ δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τό τε πιστὸν ἐς πάντας καὶ τοὺς οἰκέλους καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους εἶχεν. ὑφ' οὗπερ καὶ ὁ Νέρων ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον αὐτὸν ἀνθ' ἑαυτοῦ ἀπέστειλε, δύναμιν αὐτῷ δοῖν οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ ἐπέτρεψε, πιστεύσας ὁμοίως καὶ τοὺς βαρβάρους αὐτὸν κατεργάσασθαι καὶ αὐτῷ μὴ ἐπαναστήσασθαι.

<sup>8</sup> xiii. 9.

<sup>9</sup> xiii. 8, 9.

<sup>10</sup> ἐρεῖς γὰρ περὶ μὲν σώματος ὅτι καλὸς, ὅτι μέγας, ὅτι ταχύς, ὅτι ἰσχυρὸς.—Spengel II, p. 12. Cf. Nepos *Iph.* 3: "Fuit autem et animo magno et corpore imperatoriaque forma ut ipso aspectu cuius iniceret admirationem sui."

giving of hostages by Vologeses afford the occasion for a quarrel between the centurion and the praefect, and this quarrel serves to bring out the preference of the natives for Corbulo. The quarrel is of slight importance except in so far as it adds an encomiastic touch to Corbulo. It now develops into a disagreement between Quadratus and Corbulo. The former contended that his victories had been wrenched from him, while the latter claimed that no hostages were offered until he had been chosen to conduct the war. That the writer believed that Corbulo's claim was correct is clearly shown from what has already been stated in regard to the preference of all classes for him, the implication being that whatever advantage Quadratus had gained was wholly due to the influence of Corbulo. And yet while the success thus far gained was due to the influence of Corbulo on the natives of the East, Nero, in order to settle the dispute, ordered the laurel to be added to the imperial fasces. The situation as here represented is similar to that when Corbulo was forbidden to conduct further operations against the Chauci. The writer's object was to make his readers feel that Corbulo received no assistance from the emperors, but that it was by his own abilities that he acquired distinction and glory.

The war against the Parthians<sup>11</sup> which had been prolonged with little vigor was now taken up in earnest, because Vologeses would neither allow his brother Tiridates to be deprived of the kingdom which he had given him, nor would he allow him to hold it as a gift from a foreign power. This situation served to give an encomiastic touch to the narrative in the comparison of Corbulo with Lucullus. It is a case of *σύγκρισις* as recognized by the rhetoricians. Lucullus and Pompey were two of Rome's greatest generals. Their campaigns had taken place in Armenia, but since their day Roman prestige had waned much in the East. The author represents Corbulo as thinking it worthy of the greatness of the Roman people to recover what these two generals of an earlier age had acquired.

It would be difficult to find a more elaborate characterization of a man than we have in chap. 35. There is first given a statement of the deplorable condition of affairs which had to be corrected before anything could be accomplished in the way of active military operations. It is a dark background over against which are set the meritorious qualities of the strict and inexorable disciplinarian. The difficulty of fighting one enemy is great

<sup>11</sup> We have no further mention of Corbulo until that given under the year 58. The time included from the date of his landing in the East and this date was doubtless spent in collecting and disciplining an army. And as the author was not concerned with a time element and was dealing primarily with the *πράξεις* he very likely passed these years over in silence.



enough, but here Corbulo has a greater task in contending against the *ignaviam* of the soldiers than against the *perfidiam* of the enemy. The difficulties he has to contend with are shown by depicting the condition of the army: soldiers sluggish from a long peace and most reluctantly performing the duties of the camp; veterans in the army who had never performed picket duty nor acted as sentinels and who would have regarded a rampart or foss as something strange and marvelous; without helmets and cuirasses, dandified, avaricious, performing their military service in the towns. In this situation there is an implied *σύγκρισις* in Corbulo's favor. For the demoralized condition of the troops is due wholly or in great measure to the inefficiency of previous commanders, and this state of affairs he succeeds in entirely changing. He begins by dismissing all who were incapacitated by age or sickness. He made new levies throughout Galatia and Cappadocia and a force was summoned from Germany. Such was the condition which Corbulo found and changed—demoralization of the army, on the one hand, the levying of new troops and their training and the summoning of a legion from far distant Germany, on the other. To complete the discipline the troops were kept under tents in one of the most severe winters. The limbs of many were frost-bitten and it was observed of one soldier that as he carried a bundle of wood his hands were so frozen that they fell off, still clinging to their burden—a palpable exaggeration, but exaggeration is an element commonly found in encomiastic treatments. The story is simply told to magnify the severity of the winter and the strictness of the general in his discipline. And now we are given a picture of the general, the very type of a great leader who shares the hardships of his soldiers but who has in him that stern and unyielding nature of the old Roman of early days. The description of him is given added force by the rhetorical device of asyndeton; *ipse cultu levi, capite intecto, in agmine, in laboribus frequens adesse, laudem strenuis, solacium invalidis, exemplum omnibus ostendere*. The severity of the winter and service caused many to desert, but not as in the case of other armies, where a first or second offense was pardoned, did Corbulo let his soldiers go free. Death was the penalty for desertion and this strict discipline was justified from the results which followed, namely, that there were fewer desertions than in those camps where pardon was granted.

In this chap. 36 we have an implied *σύγκρισις* between Corbulo and Paccius Orfitus. Corbulo kept his troops in camp until spring should open. But Paccius Orfitus who seems to have been in a camp at some distance was eager to attack the barbarians while off their guard, as he thought, and he had written Corbulo to this effect, but was ordered by his

superior to keep within his fortifications and await greater forces. These commands he disobeyed and was defeated, which so displeased Corbulo that he ordered Paccius and his troops to keep outside the rampart. From this disgrace they were released only by the prayers of the entire army. Herein we see two qualities of Corbulo—his wisdom in foreseeing danger and judging a situation and, though strict and severe, his willingness to yield to the prayers of the whole army. In this chapter there is not a single historical event recorded. Paccius Orfitus, a subordinate officer who disobeys orders and is punished, is used simply as a foil to Corbulo.

Active operations now begin for the first time. Tiridates supported by his brother Vologeses begins to make war openly in Armenia, but in what part of Armenia we are not told. He avoided a conflict with the united forces of the Romans, flitting hither and thither in keeping with Parthian tactics. Corbulo tried long in vain to get a battle, but was compelled to divide his forces and invade different places at the same time. He also won over the Moschi who proved a valuable ally to the Romans. So the plans of Tiridates miscarried and he sent a committee to expostulate with Corbulo. In this the encomiastic element consists in Corbulo's adaptability. He tried to win a battle on Roman lines of fighting, but could not because the enemy would not fight that way. So he divided his troops, used Parthian tactics, and met with complete success. The tone of Tiridates' message as delivered by his ambassadors was one of complaint and haughty braggadocio: *sin perstaretur in bello, non defore Arsacidis virtutem fortunamque saepius iam clade Romana expertam*. In contrast to this we have in Corbulo a commander conscious of his victory and his mastery of the situation, self-possessed, and free from any spirit of boastfulness: *ad ea Corbulo, satis comperto Vologeses defectione Hyrcaniae attineri, suadet Tiridati precibus Caesarem adgredi*. This characterization of Corbulo as moderate in the use of his victories, as seeking substantial results and not mere pomp and display is one that is consistent throughout the narrative and must not be lost sight of.

The shrewdness of Corbulo in detecting the designs of his enemy is further amplified in chap. 38. A conference had been arranged for between Corbulo and Tiridates. To this conference Tiridates stipulated that he would bring a thousand troops, but that Corbulo might bring as many as he pleased, provided they came without helmets and corselets. Such a trick would be apparent to any man, to say nothing of a *vetus et providus dux*, for any number of such troops would be useless against a cavalry using arrows. Nevertheless Corbulo does not pretend to understand the trick, but proceeds to arrange for the conference. His cleverness is

shown in choosing a place for the deploying of troops, in his arranging the allied cohorts and auxiliaries on the wings, the sixth legion in the center, with three thousand added from the third legion—all under one eagle, so that the appearance was that of one legion. However, the conference came to naught, either because Tiridates suspected some trick, or else he hoped to intercept the provisions which he had heard were coming to the Romans by way of Trapezus. But in this again he was unsuccessful by reason of the precautions taken by Corbulo, who had the supplies brought in under escort. The name of Trapezus is mentioned only incidentally and it is from this that we get the first clue as to Corbulo's location. The name is brought in only incidentally and gives an encomiastic touch to the narrative in showing the foresight taken by Corbulo for his commissary department.

The negotiations having failed, Corbulo determined that the war should not needlessly be dragged on longer and that he would compel the Armenians to defend their own possessions. The characterizing element comes out in Corbulo's choosing the most formidable stronghold in all that praefecture which he himself will storm. Volandum being the strongest fort he takes upon himself the heaviest task in its reduction, but in destroying it he wins the greatest glory. Observe that two other nameless forts of lesser significance are assigned to a lieutenant and a praefect of the camp respectively and although they were captured they are dismissed with the bare statement: *pari fortuna legatus ac praefectus usi sunt*. But we have an elaborate description of the taking of Volandum. First an inspection of the fort and its suitable points of attack is made. The soldiers are urged to punish perfidy and cowardice and win glory and booty. The army of attack is divided into four divisions. Some form a testudo to undermine the walls; others bring scaling ladders; many throw firebrands, and spears are hurled from engines of war; leaden slugs were hurled from close range; and such was the zeal of the soldiers that within the third part of a day the walls were stripped of defenders and the towers of the gates came tumbling down. The place was taken by storm and with what result? Simply, *omnes puberes trucidati sunt, nullo milite omisso, paucis admodum vulneratis*. Surely this is a very elaborate description of a fight in which the Romans lost not a soldier. The account is a characterizing description pure and simple. Everything that does not lend itself to this purpose is left out. We are not told where Volandum was nor how many troops there were in it. I believe that it was some place of very minor importance, and was used simply as a means to bring out the praise of Corbulo. The encomiast has exalted its capture into a great victory for

him who took it, but the facts will scarcely bear out the idea of its being a great stronghold. While the taking of the other two forts is so briefly narrated, yet what is said serves to amplify the praise of Corbulo by showing that his general plan met with entire success. The omission of their names and the description of their capture make more prominent the part played by Corbulo.

After the capture of the three forts and the surrender of various unnamed places we are told that confidence arose that Artaxata could be captured. At this point we have one of the clearest indications of the author's disregard for chronology. In the context there is not a hint as to the location of Volandum, nor the time when it was taken. I have given my reasons for believing that it was not the 'Ολανή of Strabo and that it was captured in the year 58. But no mention whatever is made of the winter quarters 58-59, nor of the march to Artaxata. I cannot believe that a careful annalist in seeking to give a careful record of events would have omitted such important facts in the march of Corbulo from the western border of Armenia up to Artaxata, had he been writing history at first hand. Tacitus has evidently followed the account of some writer who was not concerned with historical facts *per se*, but picked out and made use of such points only as lent themselves most readily to an encomiastic treatment.

We are at once told of the precautions taken by Corbulo to prevent a surprise by the enemy while he is marching to Artaxata. As further proof of the encomiastic trend of the narrative we are not given a hint as to where Tiridates has been or what he has been doing. He is brought on the scene as a foil to the Roman leader to show the effectiveness of the latter's plans on the march. Corbulo does not lead his troops by the direct route to Artaxata, for in that case they would have been exposed to greater danger and herein is shown again, as we have already seen, that foresight of a cautious general. A brief picture of Tiridates follows, but it adds no historical fact of importance. Out of shame and fear, *pudore et metu*, he is forced to take some active measures against the Romans, but they are of no effect against the well-laid plans of Corbulo. He resolved to offer battle or rather to lure the Romans into an ambush by pretending flight. This statement then leads to the encomiastic phrase, *non ignaro duce nostro, qui viae pariter et pugnae composuerat exercitum*, and we have a careful description of the plans for the march made by Corbulo. We are told what legion was placed on the right wing and what on the left; what forces were stationed in the center; and how many soldiers guarded the rear and the commands given them. We are told where the bowmen and other cavalry forces were stationed. In the whole description we have an elabor-

rate *σύγκρισις*. Tiridates out of shame and fear is driven to do something, but our general, *non ignaro duce nostro*, goes forward with the consciousness of plans so well laid that victory is sure to follow. To add emphasis to the validity of Corbulo's plans it is said that one *decurio militum* advanced too boldly and was slain by the archers of the enemy, which incident served as a wholesome example to the rest of the troops of the necessity of obedience. This way of lauding the wisdom of Corbulo's plans by picking out one or two characters who act contrary to them and are punished is a favorite method. For example, we recall the story of the two men punished in the camp, the one for having no side arms, and the other for being girt with a dagger only, and the disobedience of Paccius Orfitus. The loss of one nameless *decurio militum* was certainly an insignificant thing in itself but served admirably well to show the wisdom of the leader's plans.

Tiridates, failing in his attempts to draw Corbulo from his fixed purpose, and night coming on, withdrew, while Corbulo measured off a camp. The latter, not sure as to what Tiridates intended, was in doubt whether to go on to Artaxata that same night. But scouts sent out brought back word that the enemy was withdrawing either to the Medians or Albanians, so he waited till the following day, on which, when preparations for storming the city had been made, Artaxata surrendered. The inhabitants secured safety by surrendering, but we must understand by this their lives only, for the city was at once burned to the ground. The reasons for doing so are given. The city, on account of the size of the walls, could not be held without a strong garrison, and that was not available. Then, if the city should be left intact and ungarrisoned, there would be *nulla utilitas aut gloria* in its capture. It is not likely that Corbulo in his *Memoirs* would have given as a reason for destroying the city, *nulla gloria*. The whole course of his life, as we have it, shows clearly that he was not seeking glory for glory's sake. "Gloria" followed as a consequence from his successful career, but his encomiast represented him as seeking after it. The whole incident as a historical fact is treated very cursorily, and this is due to the fact that the writer is concerned with the praise of his hero and not with facts as facts of history. He uses them only so far as they lend themselves to characterization.

We have here the much-disputed question of the "miraculum." Was it an eclipse or not? All commentators save Egli assume that it was not. Henderson says: "The identification is impossible. Not only could Corbulo scarcely have reached the city so soon, but the description of the miraculum in Tac. *Ann.* xiii. 41.4 is inconsistent with any possible effect of an eclipse, however partial. And to go on to accuse Corbulo of not knowing

an eclipse when he saw it, and thus describing it wrongly, is a perversely topsy-turvy argument."<sup>12</sup> But Henderson himself turns around and indulges in a "perversely topsy-turvy argument" in assuming that a body of legionary soldiers would not understand, but could be so moved by an "atmospheric effect of cloud and sunshine." Such effects of cloud and sunshine do not occur, and how he can say that Corbulo described a "novel effect of cloud, sunshine, and storm, . . . clearly and well," if he saw it, is hard to comprehend. But as will be seen from the quotations regarding eclipses which I have given in the chapter on "Chronology," there is a similarity of description between them and this passage. There is an element in this description which is true of an eclipse but could never be true of "cloud and sunshine," and that is the strange effect which eclipses of the sun always produce on men's minds. This is a fact so well known that it scarcely needs comment. In *Ann.* i. 2. 8, during a meeting in camp an eclipse of the moon occurred, and to avoid the evil predicted thereby the legionaries clashed bronze instruments. Here, be it observed, the clouds played a part, but it was the eclipse itself which affected their minds. The effect of an eclipse on the minds of the Athenian troops before Syracuse, *Thuc.* vii. 50. 4, is familiar. St. Maximus of Turin rebuked the people in the following words for making a clamor to avert the evils of an eclipse:

*Cum ante dies plerosque de vestrae avaritiae cupiditate pulsaverim, ipsa die circa vesperum tanta vociferatio populi extilit, ut religiositas eius penetraret ad caelum. Quod cum requirerem, quid sibi clamor hic vellet, dixerunt mihi, quod laboranti lunae vestra vociferatio subveniret et defectum eius suis clamoribus adiuvaret.*<sup>13</sup>

The references might be multiplied *ad libitum* but never do we hear of any such effect produced by clouds and sunshine.

With reference to the description, we may ask what is the significance of it as given in Tacitus? Did Corbulo describe the eclipse as we have it recorded? That he did so may very well be questioned. But that the phenomena observed were very unusual is a reasonable inference. The eclipse afforded an excellent excuse for the destruction of the city when we recall the way in which the ancient peoples looked upon such phenomena. The explanation is that we have here an account as given by some panegyrist whose aim was not one of historical accuracy, but a characterization of the Roman leader. It is an exaggeration with the aim of showing that even the forces of nature were working to aid in the fulfilment of Corbulo's

<sup>12</sup> *The Life and Principate of the Emperor Nero*, p. 473.

<sup>13</sup> Quoted by Ginzel *Spezieller Canon der Finsternisse*, p. 219.

plan. It was used to justify his destruction of the city. As I have stated before, it was a commonplace with ancient encomiasts to exaggerate any fact which thereby would amplify the praise of the person concerned. Even Cicero in lauding the good qualities of Pompey says: *venti tempestatesque obsecundarint*.<sup>14</sup> In the account of this *miraculum* in Tacitus, I think we can see indicated the handling of it by three different persons. The first was Corbulo, who saw the eclipse and described in his *Memoirs* the strange phenomena which he observed; the second was some panegyrist, who took the incident and gave to it an exaggerated interpretation as a *miraculum velut numine oblatum* for the praise of Corbulo; the third was Tacitus, who felt that the account he was following was too exaggerated to be true, and that he did not care to give it as a statement of fact and so introduced it with the qualifying word *adicitur*. And more especially do the words *ut . . . crederetur* show that Tacitus stands apart from the account that was given.

Beginning with *ob haec consulatus*, in chap. 41, I believe we have Tacitus' own words, while that which goes immediately before was taken almost bodily from his source. The narrative continues in xiv. 23 without the least break in thought with what precedes. Artaxata once destroyed, Corbulo is represented as that *providus dux*. He knew how to make use of a victory and at once set out for Tigranocerta. News of the destruction of Artaxata would either inspire fear in the enemy, or else, if he should spare Tigranocerta, would win for him a reputation for clemency. The narration at once passes into a characterization of the general. This is apparent from the absence of all data in chaps. 23, 24, relating to the march, except the two very general and indefinite statements that the Romans passed along the borders of the Mardi and that they came into Tauronitium. The whole account is given up to a personal record of Corbulo. The march is described: *non infenso exercitu, ne spem auferret, neque tamen remissa cura*, which recalls the way in which he went against the Chauçi, *magna cum cura*. We have his dealings with the submissive: *misericordia adversus supplices*; with the fugitives: *celeritate adversus profugus*; and with the stubborn: *inmitis iis*. Even the mention of the Mardi serves only to show Corbulo's economy of Roman lives: *quos Corbulo inmissis Hiberis vastavit hostilemque audaciam externo sanguine ultus est*. We have standing out conspicuously his heroic example in endurance of drought, heat, and long marches as we had it before in the piercing cold of the camp: *ad hoc penuria aquae, fervida aestas, longinqua itinera sola ducis patientia mitigabantur, eadem pluraque gregio milite tolerantis*. We have his peril

<sup>14</sup> *Pro Man.* 48.

from threatened assassination. His *clementia* is shown in his treatment of the surrendered city Tigranocerta, in not allowing any plundering to take place in it. In regard to the fort Legerda we have the mere statement that it was taken by storm because the hot-headed young men had shut it up, without being given a hint as to its location or its strength. Then the return of the Hyrcanian embassy and the escort assigned it so far as the Red Sea and the repulse of Tiridates, who had entered *per Medos extrema Armeniae*, are recounted. But these statements with the following one, *caedibus et incendiis perpopulatus possessionem Armeniae usurpabat*, simply conform to the general indefiniteness of the historical narrative which we have observed throughout the whole. They are not used as facts of history *per se*.

Chap. 26 closes with an account of the arrival of Tigranes, his establishment on the throne, preparations made for his defense and the withdrawal of Corbulo to Syria. The narrative continues at the beginning of book xv. and without any apparent break. In chaps. 1 and 2 there is an account of the attitude of the Parthians. Tiridates was naturally hesitating. He wished to exact vengeance for the slights inflicted upon the race of the Arsacidae, yet he was held back by a consciousness of Roman greatness and by reverence for a continued and unbroken treaty. He was incensed by Tigranes' plundering expedition among the Adiabeniens. Other nations were looking to him for assistance, and were placed in such a situation that unless they received it they would be compelled to make terms with the Romans. He was an exile from his kingdom, and by his very silence greatly moved the people. In this situation Vologeses called an assembly, and his address is given in chap. 2, together with a brief summary of the preparations made to drive out the Romans. It might seem that here we have a narration of events pure and simple, such as would be in keeping with an annalistic arrangement and this is true, but the narrating of historical events is not inconsistent with encomiastic treatment. I have already shown that these events did not happen in the year under which they are recorded. All geographical data which might enable us to locate the Parthians are lacking, and we get no clue as to where they were until the description of Tigranocerta given in chap. 4. It is simply a *σχῆμα συγκριτικόν*. The account given aims to depict the feelings and desperate situation of the Parthians, which would lead them to put forth every possible effort to recover their lost territory, which loss had come about by Corbulo's overrunning Armenia. But the attempt to recover met with dismal failure, for Corbulo had heard of their intentions and even before had taken such precautions for the defense of Tigranocerta that their assaults were of no



avail. They were the plans of a *providus dux*, and in encountering them the enemy *semet frustratur*. The siege was a dismal failure. Those who had engaged in it had been routed. Tigranes and his forces were safe within their walls, while legions had been sent into Armenia and others were prepared to break in from the borders of Syria and in lieu of this situation an embassy was sent to the Roman leader and Monaeses was ordered to quit Tigranocerta.

Chap. 6 contains a series of questions which evidently give the criticism of Corbulo's opponents. Some commentators claim to see herein a criticism of him by Tacitus, but I think that Tacitus is not voicing a personal opinion, but is simply following his source. The situation is similar to that as given in *Ann.* xi. 19, in which case it has been said that Corbulo was criticized by Tacitus. We saw, at that point, that most people, *plerosque*, commended him, while certain ones, *quosdam*, criticized. So here, the majority, *plures*, approved Corbulo's course, and only some, *alii*, interpreted his actions as due to some secret compact. There was, no doubt, criticism of Corbulo, but in each case the author makes it clear that it came from the minority while the majority approved. And in view of Corbulo's career, before and after this, entirely successful and honorable, there was absolutely nothing to justify the criticism of the minority. Not one of his plans had miscarried, except in a case or two where a subordinate officer was disobedient to commands, but in no instance was any reflection cast upon Corbulo. Rather, it only went to prove his wisdom.

Paetus, who had been appointed by the Roman government to take charge of Armenia, now appears, and a division of the forces is made. Corbulo was to remain in Syria. From this point to the end of the account we have a strong contrast between the two generals. On the one hand, is the reserved, effective commander; on the other, the boastful, timid, inefficient. To say, as some have said, that Corbulo in his *Memoirs* has blackened Paetus' record for his own glorification, is gratuitous. Doubtless he did depict that man as a sorry general, but his encomiast to bring out the contrast more strongly has selected the weak points in his character and painted them in a bad light. There was some justification for the criticism, but I doubt whether the writer was concerned about that phase of the question. The phrase, *neque aemuli patiens*, has been interpreted by Furneaux as implying criticism of Corbulo, but we must interpret this in the light of the whole context and of the intent of the author in using the phrase. He felt it no criticism to say that Corbulo could brook no rival when that rival was such a person as he has depicted him to be, a boastful, inefficient leader, just arrived to take charge of a work of which he knew

nothing. He meant it in commendation of him as is shown by the very next sentence: *Paetus, cui satis ad gloriam erat, si proximus haberetur, despiciebat gesta.*

The character of Paetus at once appears in contrast with that of Corbulo by his boastfulness. He said that Corbulo had made a practice of storming cities only in name: *usurpatis nomine tenuis urbium expugnationes dictitans*, while he would thoroughly subdue and reduce to a province: *se tributa ac leges et pro umbra regis Romanum ius victis impositurum*. The embassy sent to Rome by Vologeses having returned without being successful in its mission, the war was again taken up by the Parthians, and we are told that Paetus did not decline it. However, at the very outset his conduct is shown in an unfavorable light by his utter disregard for the omens. The horse bearing the consular insignia refused to cross a bridge; a sacrificial victim escaped out of the rampart and javelins of the soldiers took fire, but all these Paetus scorned. This action is in contrast to that of Corbulo when, on entering Armenia to recover what Paetus had lost, he first performed in due order the lustrum. Paetus is further contrasted by his lack of preparation and foresight and his hastiness in action: *necdum satis firmatis hibernaculis, nullo rei frumentariae provisu, rapit exercitum trans montem Taurum recipiendis, ut ferebat, Tigranocertis vastandisque regionibus, quas Corbulo integras omisisset*. But in spite of this, he did gain some success, yet did not know how to preserve it, and the author seems to have disparaged even this: *gloriaeque et praedae nonnihil partum, si aut gloriam cum modo aut praedam cum cura habuisset*. Corbulo knew how to turn a victory to account, as we saw in the case of the destruction of Artaxata. We saw that he came to the Chauci *magna cum cura*, and his carefulness all the way through in the laying of his plans. Though Paetus captured a few forts, the impression the writer aims to give us is that his campaign was entirely without results, except to show his incapacity and boastfulness, for he wrote to Nero in a manner as if the war were already ended, in grandiloquent style, but void of results: *verbis magnificis rerum vacuas*.

The author has shown the inefficiency of Paetus in conducting a campaign, and his inability to maintain whatever advantage he might have gained. In contrast to this, he now turns to Corbulo and shows his activity and energy in fortifying the Euphrates.

While the enemy were present in the plains on the Armenian side, they were prevented from interfering with the bridge-building by the diligent use of catapulta and ballista. Then when the bridge was completed and the troops had seized the opposite hills, by the mere display of such activity

and strength, *tanta celeritate et ostentatione virium*, the enemy ceased their demonstrations against Corbulo and turned their attention to Paetus. We are now reminded of the incompetency of Paetus, *imminentium nescius*, who had the fifth legion far off in Pontus and had weakened the rest of his forces by indiscriminate furloughs. Still in spite of his weakened condition he could have held his camp and warded off the Parthians but he lacked steadfastness in his own plans and those of others: *si Paeto aut in suis aut in aliis consiliis constantia fuisset*. He left the winter quarters with a boast that not a foss and rampart but their bodies and arms would be opposed to the enemy. After the loss of a few men he returned in consternation to his fortifications, and when the Parthians did not press on immediately, with idle confidence, *vana fiducia*, he placed three thousand of his legionaries on Mt. Taurus, thinking the enemy thereby could be checked. He placed his wife and son in Arsamosata for protection and reluctantly informed Corbulo of his situation. Vologeses pressed on. The auxiliaries were frightened away. The legionaries were cut down and the one fort, a *turris*, which held out for a time, was taken by storm. As the sound and the wounded came straggling into camp the confusion increased. Paetus made no effort to control the situation, but sent a second urgent request for assistance to Corbulo: *ne dux quidem obniti adversis, sed cuncta militiae munia deseruerat, missis iterum ad Corbulonem precibus, veniret propere, signa et aquilas et nomen reliquum infelicis exercitus tueretur*. With Paetus everything was confusion and demoralization, while with Corbulo there was energetic action with calm deliberation. He is undismayed, leaves a part of his troops to guard the Euphrates and with thorough preparation hastens by forced marches to Paetus' relief. He ordered the first of the defeated troops who met him to return and seek the clemency of Paetus. Then by a speech to his own men he fired them to a zeal of marching day and night to rescue the Roman camp and Roman legions.

In chaps. 13, 14 we have a further description of the demoralized condition among Paetus' troops and his own lack of control over them. He was reduced to the point of being compelled to write a letter to Vologeses, not, we are told, as a suppliant, but as complaining of Vologeses' action in resisting the king of Roman choice. Paetus is put in the attitude in which we saw Tiridates put in xiii. 37, that of a leader already defeated and making an outcry against the injustice done him. He reminded Vologeses that all the rest of the Roman world was at peace, while he was making his attack upon but two legions. He reminded him of the careers of Lucullus, Pompey, and Caesar in Armenia. But what a contrast between them and him, while Corbulo is compared favorably with them. To these com-

plaints Vologeses replied that the name of holding and bestowing might rest with the Romans, but the power was with the Parthians. It was finally agreed between Paetus and Vologeses that all Roman forces were to withdraw from Armenia. The forts and provisions were to be turned over to the Parthians, and to heap insult on injury, the Romans were forced to build a bridge over the Arsanias as a monument of the Parthian victory. Rumor had it that the legions were sent under the yoke. At any rate the withdrawal was a most disgraceful one, for the Parthians lined the roads and took away the slaves, clothing and arms, while the Roman troops fled in fear, avoiding anything which might occasion a conflict. It is evident that Paetus had abundant supplies, while on Corbulo's authority the statement was made that the Parthians were in need of supplies, and that they would have given up the siege and that he himself was but three days' march away. Paetus in the presence of envoys from Vologeses is represented as having taken an oath that no Roman should enter Armenia until word was brought back from Nero. At this point Tacitus again expresses his dissent from his source. He felt that the rhetorical elaboration was too great to be consistent with the facts, and that the author had gone too far in blackening Paetus' character, so he says that granting that some of these things were given to increase the disgrace of Paetus, *quæ ut augendæ infamiæ composita, eis reliqua non in obscuro habentur*, yet there is no doubt that Paetus marched forty miles in one day after his defeat and that the wounded were abandoned everywhere so that the retreat was more like a rout.

Corbulo met the retreating army on the Euphrates River, and out of compassion for the defeated and bedraggled troops, he did not present a display of standards and arms. It shows his compassion for the common soldier, as we have seen before in his enduring with them the hardships of camp and march, and it contrasts him strongly with Paetus, who had fled leaving the wounded all along the road. Between the generals, the conference was brief. Paetus was for invading Armenia at once with their united forces, and claimed that everything was as it had been before his capitulation. But that would have been in violation of the oath he had taken that no Roman should enter Armenia until word had been received from Rome. Further, his troops were either destroyed or utterly demoralized. The two men could not have worked together, for the author has told us that Corbulo could "brook no rival," and he shows that he had no orders from Rome to enter Armenia, and we have seen that he was a man who strictly obeyed orders. Whether the arguments given by Paetus in regard to the immediate invasion of Armenia, or those given by Corbulo

for not doing so, be right, does not concern the present discussion. I think it clear that the writer wanted his readers to feel that the course of Corbulo was the correct one.

We find in the account from the time Paetus appears down to his defeat not much more than an amplified description of his inefficiency. In one year he has lost practically all that Corbulo had won in several years of arduous preparation and campaign. It is only a description which paints in darkest colors the defeated general. Paetus was a poor general, and we may assume that Corbulo described him so, but whoever wrote the account from which Tacitus drew chose to magnify the worse side of Paetus and pass over any good qualities he may have possessed. The whole is an elaborate rhetorical *σύγκρισις* which serves to bring out most distinctly the meritorious qualities of the general Corbulo. This becomes more apparent when we bear in mind the disregard for all chronology and topography. The withdrawal into winter quarters is mentioned, but we have to take the whole episode into consideration and by laborious inference determine what winter quarters are meant, but we have no clue as to their locations. Arsamosata, a fort, is mentioned in the most incidental way, while we learn that Paetus was somewhere on the Arsian River north of Mt. Taurus, but nothing more definitely. Armenia was lost and we have now again to follow the successful course of Corbulo.

During the winter the commission from Vologeses went to Rome and returned without any success. The war was now put entirely into Corbulo's hands. All the military forces of the East were turned over to him while the native rulers of dependent states were ordered to obey him. The encomiastic nature of this comes out when we are told that Corbulo's power was almost equal to that of Pompey in the war with the pirates: *in tantum ferme modum aucta potestate quem populus Romanus Cn. Pompeio bellum piraticum gesturo dederat*. An account of the careful preparations made to invade Armenia follows. The least efficient troops were transferred to Syria for garrison duty, while the best were assembled for the expedition. Then in contrast to Paetus who had disregarded important omens, he performs the lustrum in due form and addresses his troops.

Corbulo is represented as following the line of march, by which Lucullus had at one time penetrated into the country, but the reasons for this are hard to see, for the army never seems to have gone farther than the scene of Paetus' defeat, which was not more than two ordinary days' march from the Euphrates. It is evidently a straining after a comparison with that famous general for the purpose of lauding Corbulo. When ambassadors came from Tiridates and Vologeses, who were soon forced to send them,

Corbulo did not scorn them: *venientes Tiridatis Vologesisque de pace legatos haud aspernatus*. This is a quality of Corbulo which is followed consistently throughout. He is free from all spirit of boastfulness, and while always successful he tempers his success with sound judgment. When, as we saw in xiii. 37 he had forced Tiridates to send an embassy to Nero to seek a settlement, although he knew he was master of the situation, yet he followed a moderate course of action: *satis comperto Vologesen defectione Hyrcaniae attineri, suadet Tiridati Caesarem adgredi*. In the campaign against Vologeses, again entirely successful, he thought he should moderate his victory: *quamvis secundis rebus suis, moderandum fortunae ratus misit ad Vologesen*.<sup>15</sup> With this calm deliberation on the part of Corbulo we have contrasted the impulsiveness of the centurion Casperius who was sent in the embassy to Vologeses and who delivered his commands *ferociter*. Just why he should have done so there is no apparent reason, but his action contrasts remarkably with that of Corbulo. In the final settlement with the Parthians when Corbulo is represented as having everything in his own hands he moderates his victory, allowing Vologeses to have his own way in non-essentials. Yet, while seeming to make some concessions, he is really successful at every point: *scilicet externae superbiae sueto non inerat notitia nostri, apud quos vis imperii valet, inania tramittuntur*.<sup>16</sup>

In his negotiations<sup>17</sup> with Tiridates Corbulo did not relax active operations against the enemy, for the wholesome effect it would have of inspiring fear in them. He drove them from their homes, destroyed their forts, devastated their land and filled the strong and weak alike with fear. Yet in spite of this the barbarians were said to have had a natural liking and admiration for him: *non infensum nec cum hostili odio Corbulonis nomen etiam barbaris habebatur, eoque consilium eius fidum credebant*. We saw such inclination of the enemy shown for him at the time he came to the East when the hostages preferred him to Quadratus.<sup>18</sup> In the above we see Corbulo's cleverness in dealing with men, and this quality will be brought out more strongly in what follows. When Tiridates chose as a place of meeting the scene of Paetus' defeat, Corbulo offered no objection because, it is said, the dissimilarity of fortune would add to his glory: *Corbulo non vitavit, ut dissimilitudo fortunae gloriam augetet*.<sup>19</sup> We may question in our own minds whether it did add to his glory, but certainly there was no such question in the mind of his encomiast. This tendency to give the glory of Corbulo has led the writer into some peculiar statements. At the very outset it was said that Corbulo came among the Chauci, *magna cum cura*

<sup>15</sup> xv. 5.<sup>16</sup> xv. 31.<sup>17</sup> xv. 27.<sup>18</sup> xiii. 9.<sup>19</sup> xv. 28.

*et mox gloria*, which prepared the reader's mind for an encomiastic account of the hero. One reason why the hostages preferred Corbulo to Quadratus was: *per recentem gloriam*. When Artaxata was destroyed a reason assigned for its destruction was that there would be no glory in having taken it if it should be left intact: *nulla in eo utilitas aut gloria, quod capta essent*. It was said of Paetus that his glory would have been sufficient had he been subordinate to Corbulo: *Paetus, cui satis ad gloriam erat, si proximus haberetur*. But what astonishes us at first reading is to be told that when Paetus sent word informing Corbulo of his situation, Corbulo made no haste, in order to let the danger increase, so that by bringing help he might win the greater glory: *nec a Corbulone properatum, quo gliscentibus periculis etiam subsidii laus augetur*.<sup>20</sup> This, too, has been used as grounds for the criticism of Corbulo, but nothing can be more unlikely in view of the whole account and especially that which follows, because Corbulo did at once set about making preparation to go to the relief of Paetus, and when the second summons came he hastened by forced marches and so inspired his troops that they marched day and night: *diu nocturne iter properabant*.<sup>21</sup> The aim of the encomiast was to represent in a laudatory way the glory which would come to Corbulo by rescuing Paetus from the greater danger, and so from our point of view he has fallen into an unhappy characterization in his endeavor to represent Corbulo as winning a greater glory, but he has evidently intended it as an encomiastic statement. Corbulo in his *Memoirs* would never have used such a flimsy pretext for not going to the assistance of Paetus. One of the last characterizations of Corbulo is that to his "glory he added the charm of affability: he invited the king to a banquet." He was conspicuous in the social world as well as a general and statesman: *addidit gloriae comitatem epulasque*.<sup>22</sup> And it is in view of this whole course of striving after glory which the writer insists upon that we must interpret those few passages which seem to imply a base motive.

The statesmanship of Corbulo is further shown when he sends his son-in-law, Vinicianus Annius, to the camp of Tiridates to do him honor. When the two opposing generals met, Corbulo followed the eastern custom in the matter of salutation. In this is seen his adaptation to a given circumstance. He praised Tiridates for his wisdom in choosing a pacific course of action, although as a matter of fact Corbulo had forced him to do so: *exim Romanus laudat iuvenem omissis praecipitibus tuta et salutaria capessentem*.<sup>23</sup> And now from this diplomacy of Corbulo Tiridates is led to seek the kingdom from Nero. Although Corbulo had been entirely successful in the field and had forced the Parthians to terms by means of arms, yet

<sup>20</sup> XV. 10.<sup>21</sup> XV. 12.<sup>22</sup> XV. 30.<sup>23</sup> XV. 29.

it is his cleverness in diplomacy which leads Tiridates apparently to forget that and seek terms on which the Roman and Parthian could agree. Corbulo wins for the Romans what they desire, but lets the enemy believe that he is having his own way. For on the appointed day Tiridates in the presence of all the Parthians and Romans came to a tribunal on which was a statue of Nero, removed the crown from his own head and placed it on the head of the statue with the resolve not to take it back until he received it from the hand of Nero. This description leads Tacitus to add one of those tags which are so common in his writings: *at nunc versos casus; iturum Tiridaten ostentui gentibus quanto minus quam captivum?*<sup>24</sup> As already stated, Corbulo was affable toward the Parthians and gave a banquet. When his wondering guest wished to know the meaning of everything he saw or heard, Corbulo, exaggerating, moved him to an admiration of the old customs: *prisci moris*. We saw the encomiastic character of such a feeling at the very start when Corbulo brought the troops back *veterem ad morem*. And now, before going to Rome, Vologeses requests of Corbulo that Tiridates may not have to endure any appearance of slavery, nor give up his sword, nor be kept from embracing the governors of the provinces, nor be obliged to stand at their doors. This no doubt was granted and Tacitus is led again to say: *scilicet externae superbiae sucto non inerat notitia nostri, apud quos vis imperii valet, inania tramittuntur*.<sup>25</sup>

What a contrast this campaign of Corbulo affords with that of Paetus in the preceding year: thorough preparation, complete success in offensive warfare, absence of boastfulness on the part of the leader, the accomplishment of his purpose by diplomacy, and the establishment of friendly relations between Rome and the king whom he has conquered. The characterizing element is everywhere present. There is no mention of a single place after Corbulo leaves Melitene, and this is remarkable when we remember that the meeting took place on the site of Paetus' defeat. We cannot believe that Corbulo in his *Memoirs* was so careless of topography and chronology. It is unthinkable that any man in writing an account of his own campaigns would be so. But his encomiast found no occasion for using the places mentioned, and consequently left them out. What became of Tigranes who had been made king of Armenia we are not told, but a careful historian would not have passed by such a person in silence, so we are forced to conclude that Tigranes could serve no further purpose in the characterization of Corbulo, and was no longer mentioned. The policy of the Roman government, if it had any, is passed over in silence.

<sup>24</sup> xv. 29.<sup>25</sup> xv. 31.



I have shown that the writer had no chronology other than a natural sequence of events and that he disregarded all topography save such places as served to lend an encomiastic touch to Corbulo. The different persons also are used for this purpose. Tiridates appears conducting negotiations in the year 58, and serves for a time as a foil to Corbulo, but soon disappears and we hear nothing of him until the day before Corbulo reaches Artaxata, where he serves to show the splendid arrangement of Corbulo's plan of marching and fighting. He then disappears again, and we do not hear of him until the following year, 60, when he comes in *per Medos extrema Armeniae*, and affords Corbulo an opportunity of overrunning Armenia. Again he disappears, and we know nothing of his movements until he threatens Corbulo and finally defeats Paetus in 62. From this on he is used as a foil to Corbulo in setting off the latter's good qualities.

All lack of chronology in the original led Tacitus into the inconsistency of narrating under one year events which spread over several years, though perhaps we should not call it an inconsistency, for he, like modern scholars, found the narrative so constructed that it was impossible to separate and make definite assignments of events.

In the account itself, there are no data to determine what the source of Tacitus was. As I stated in the introduction, the *Memoirs* of Corbulo will be the ultimate source of all accounts dealing with his campaigns. This source is indicated in Tacitus where, in giving an account of the dispute between Corbulo and Quadratus, he uses the expression: *testante contra Corbulone*.<sup>26</sup> Again, in showing that the situation of Paetus at the time of his surrender to the Parthians, was by no means desperate, he employs the phrase: *prodiderit Corbulo*.<sup>27</sup> Some may see in these statements a direct reference to the *Memoirs* of Corbulo, but that does not necessarily follow. They simply show that Corbulo was authority for the statements given. There is nothing in the character of the expressions nor in the way in which they are used, to preclude their having been employed in any writing from which Tacitus may have drawn.

There are other statements not so definite as these, and which, at least, show that the *Memoirs* were not the only source. Tacitus might have used these expressions as his own if he had been using other records of the campaigns of Corbulo. They are expressions such as are found in any writing of a historical character and simply point to what is generally accepted, or believed about a thing without indicating any particular author. They are: *feruntque militem*,<sup>28</sup> *aegre compulsum ferunt*,<sup>29</sup> *addidit rumor*,<sup>30</sup> and

<sup>26</sup> xiii. 9.<sup>28</sup> xi. 18.<sup>30</sup> xv. 15.<sup>27</sup> xv. 16.<sup>29</sup> xv. 10.

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*satis constitit fuisse in eo exercitu.*<sup>31</sup> Furthermore, there are expressions which Corbulo would never have used in his *Memoirs*. It is not likely, for example, that he would have used the expressions last quoted above for his knowledge would have been definite, and he could have spoken with positiveness. When Paetus sent to him for aid he would never have given as an excuse for not hastening: *quo, gliscentibus periculis, etiam subsidii laus augetur.*<sup>32</sup> Nor when Tiridates proposed the place of Paetus' defeat as a place of meeting, would he have said: *Corbulo non vitavit, ut dissimilitudo fortunae gloriam auget.*<sup>33</sup> I have already referred to the excuse given for the destruction of Artaxata, that if it had not been destroyed there would have been no "glory" in having taken it. It is unthinkable to suppose that Corbulo would have represented himself as striving after glory simply in such cases. He may have been vain-glorious, but the accounts of him in Tacitus and Cassius Dio do not reveal it even though that in Tacitus represents him as striving after glory. I think, too, that Corbulo would have avoided such expressions as the following: *verbis magnificis et super experientiam sapientiamque etiam specie inanum validus.*<sup>34</sup> I have also referred to places where Tacitus expresses dissent from his source, or where he uses some such phrase as "adicitur," not caring to give full assent to the statement made. The cases in which he expresses disagreement are those in which exaggeration was used: for example, that of the punishment of the two soldiers for not being properly armed when working in the trenches, where the writer wanted to show the severity of the leader as a disciplinarian, and again where he says that certain statements were made to exaggerate the infamy of Paetus on the occasion of his defeat.

Now the *Memoirs* of Corbulo might have been the authority for Tacitus' statement: *contraque prodiderit Corbulo Parthos inopes copiarum et pabulo attrito relicturos oppugnationem, neque se plus tridui itinere afuisse.*<sup>35</sup> But I take the words *quae . . . composita*, to refer to all that precedes in chaps. 15 and 16, and another source than the *Memoirs* of Corbulo is indicated in the words *addidit rumor* of chap. 15, and *constitit* of chap. 16. The word *contra* also indicates this as it shows that what follows is given distinctly on the authority of Corbulo.

It cannot be stated whether Tacitus had at hand the *Memoirs* of Corbulo or not. If he had, he certainly would have given more information in regard to the topography and chronology which Corbulo must have given in his *Memoirs*. Bruns has shown that Tacitus characterizes by

<sup>31</sup> xiii. 35.<sup>32</sup> xv. 28.<sup>35</sup> xv. 16.<sup>33</sup> xv. 10.<sup>34</sup> xiii. 8.

means of the indirect method, but we have seen in the account of Corbulo that elaborate, direct characterization was employed, and that the technique of history was departed from. The whole account has a distinct encomiastic treatment, which is unique in the historical works of Tacitus, and it is for these reasons that I am led to the belief that he employed some encomiastic biographical account as his source.

## THE ACCOUNT OF CORBULO'S CAMPAIGNS IN CASSIUS DIO

Cassius Dio<sup>1</sup> gives an account of Corbulo's campaign against the Chauci in which he says that Corbulo united the armies and conquered the Chauci, but that when Claudius heard of his success, he recalled him out of envy and fear, lest a private citizen by his successes, should become too prominent a person. Corbulo obeyed, saying only: ὁ μακάριοι οἱ πάλοι ποτὲ στρατηγήσαντες. However, he was accorded the insignia of a triumph, and intrusted with an army which he set to digging a canal between the Rhine and the Meuse. Dio makes no mention of the personal qualities of Corbulo and his power as a disciplinarian. He omits the story of Gannascus and the punishment of two soldiers for not being properly armed when working in the trenches. The account in Tacitus eulogizes Corbulo for bringing back the army *veterem ad morem*. Dio says of him: στρατηγῶν τά τε στρατεύματα συνεκρότησε, καὶ τῶν βαρβάρων ἄλλους τε καὶ οὐς ἐκάλουν Καύχους ἐκάκωσε.

An elaborate description is given in Tacitus of the way in which Corbulo was received when he went to take charge of affairs in the East; of the preference shown him by the natives; of the demoralized condition of the army; of the strictness of discipline in the severe winter quarters,<sup>1</sup> 57-58 (?); and of the heroic figure of the commander conspicuous in the midst of it all. Dio simply states that Corbulo brought together and disciplined the scattered, demoralized army; that he filled Vologeses and Tiridates with fear; and that he did these things: οὐχ ὅτι τῷ γένει λαμπρὸς ἢ τῷ σώματι ἰσχυρός, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ ἀρτίφρων ἦν, καὶ πολὺ μὲν τὸ ἀνδρείον πολὺ δὲ καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τό τε πιστὸν ἐς πάντας καὶ τοὺς οἰκείους καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους εἶχεν. This is the most elaborate personal description, if we may call it elaborate, that Dio gives of Corbulo. He makes no mention of winter quarters, of negotiation with Vologeses, or the capture of any forts. He does not even mention Volandum, the capture of which is so elaborately described in Tacitus, which fact strengthens my belief that it was a place of no great importance. He makes no mention of the march to Artaxata, but simply states that Corbulo took the city without a struggle and destroyed it. He omits all reference to the miraculum.

The account of the march from Artaxata to Tigranocerta is substantially the same in Dio as in Tacitus, but is made briefer by omitting all personal

<sup>1</sup> Cassius Dio lx. 30; lxii. 19-23.

characterization of the general. If anything worth mentioning took place between the surrender of Tigranocerta and the establishment of Tigranes on the throne in that place, Dio does not record it. He gives an account of the efforts of Vologeses to overthrow Tigranes, which agrees with the account in Tacitus, so far as facts go, but omits all personal characterization of Corbulo.

Vologeses, at a later time, attacked Tigranocerta. Paetus came to its relief, but was driven back over Mount Taurus, and shut up in a place called Rhandaia, on the Arsanias river. Tacitus does not give the name of this place. According to Dio, Paetus could have held out against the Parthians had he not been a coward, for the enemy was without heavy-armed troops and provisions, and could not have carried on a siege. But Paetus sent to Vologeses a commission, and made an agreement whereby the Romans were to give up Armenia. The Parthians imposed on the Romans the task of bridging the Arsanias as a token of their defeat. In the meantime Corbulo, with his army, had reached the Euphrates River where he awaited Paetus. Vologeses sent a commission to Corbulo to demand the withdrawal of the Romans from beyond the Euphrates to which demand Corbulo agreed, on condition that the Parthians withdraw from Armenia.

Dio omits all reference to the strained relations between Corbulo and Paetus. Tacitus had found in his source that the army of Paetus was sent under the yoke, a statement which he doubted, and thought was added to increase the disgrace of Paetus. Dio makes no allusion to such a thing, which, I think, shows that Tacitus was following an author who blackened Paetus' character in order to make that of Corbulo stand out more conspicuously.

After the agreement between Corbulo and Vologeses at the Euphrates River, the latter sent an embassy to Nero, but it returned without having accomplished much. Corbulo was again placed in command of affairs in Armenia, and openly prepared to make war on the Parthians, but secretly advised Vologeses to send his brother, Tiridates, to Nero to seek the kingdom, which he did. The Romans and Parthians met to adjudicate matters at Rhandaia, as that place was acceptable to both: τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ χωρίον ἀμφοτέροις ἤρεσε, τῷ μὲν ὅτι ἀπολαμβάντες ἐς αὐτὸ τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ὑποσπόνδους ἀφήκαν, πρὸς ἐνδειξιν ὧν εὐηργέτηντο τῷ δὲ ὅτι τὴν δύσκειαν τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ πρότερον συμβᾶσαν σφισιν ἀποτρίψεσθαι ἐμελλον. The account in Tacitus makes Corbulo choose this place: *ut dissimilitudo fortunae gloriam auget.* But this is in keeping with the author's effort to show that Corbulo acquired "glory." I think we have the correct explanation in Dio.

The account of the erection of a platform, the setting-up of an image of Nero, and the removal by Vologeses of the crown from his own head, and placing it on the image, is substantially the same in both authors, but in Tacitus we have an amplified description of the military preparations made by Corbulo, of his complete success, and of the "glory" he acquired in giving a banquet to his wondering guest.

A comparison of the two authors will show that so far as facts of history go, the two accounts are essentially the same. It is true that what we have from Dio is an epitomized account. But the author has adhered strictly to the technique of history, while in Tacitus we have the same historical facts somewhat amplified with the addition of elaborate, direct, personal characterization.

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